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CREATING A FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING FEDERAL 
AGENCY RULES IMPACTING ARBITRATION 
 





Since 1985, the analysis for determining how to resolve a conflict 
between the Federal Arbitration Act and another federal statute has been 
clear—courts should consider whether Congress evidenced a “contrary 
congressional command” stating that arbitration agreements may not be 
enforced under the statute. In contrast, no court has created an analytical 
framework to consider how to compare federal regulatory actions (by rule 
or adjudication) prohibiting enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements. This article fills the gap and suggests two frameworks under 
which agency actions prohibiting enforcement of arbitration agreements 
could be considered—a “contrary congressional command” rule focused 
on the enabling legislation or a “contrary regulatory command” rule 
focused on the regulation itself. Although both rules can be supported by 
public policy, the “contrary congressional command” rule more closely 
applies current arbitration law to this new context of regulatory actions. 
This article traces the origins of the “contrary congressional command” 
rule and demonstrates how that rule can be used in cases involving agency 
action. This article also gives concrete examples of how the different 
frameworks would lead to different results depending on the statutory 
language at issue, the agency action, and the conceptual framework chosen 
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The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) appears to be almost as immutable 
as the Ten Commandments. Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, and the Act 
remains almost completely unrevised in its more than ninety years of 
existence.1 The world has changed significantly since the FAA’s passage, 
and arbitration practice has evolved while the statutory framework has not. 
At that time, most arbitration involved breaches of contracts between 
commercial entities.2 Merchants used arbitration to take advantage of its 
expediency and ability to appoint expert decision-makers. As time 
progressed, parties began using arbitration to resolve a wide variety of 
disputes, including cases involving statutory rights,3 consumer claims,4 
employment claims,5 class actions,6 and countless other types of disputes. 
Likely, Congress did not envision a system of arbitration dealing with 
consumers, franchisees, and non-unionized workers,7 and the FAA is ill-
 
1.  In 1947, the FAA was codified, and Congress slightly modified some of the provisions in 
1956. Chapter Two, enacting the New York Convention for international arbitration awards, was passed 
by Congress in 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 
(2012)). In 1988, Congress made the “act of the state” doctrine inapplicable to the FAA and enacted 
procedures for litigants to appeal immediately certain district court orders unfavorable to arbitration. 
Pub. L. No. 100-669, § 1, 102 Stat. 3969 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 15-16 (2012)). Congress 
enacted Chapter Three, dealing with certain international arbitral awards in 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-369, 
§ 1, 104 Stat. 448 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (2012)).  
2.  See Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitration Act Through the Lens of History, 
2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 122 (“What is immediately apparent from studying the history of the FAA is 
that the statute was intended to support a modest system of arbitration of contractual disputes between 
merchants through limited procedures available in federal court.”); see also KRISTEN M. BLANKLEY & 
MAUREEN A. WESTON, UNDERSTANDING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, §9.02 (2017).  
3.  Even as early as the 1950s, consumer claims—including statutory claims—were subject to 
arbitration. As discussed below, Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), was one of the first cases to reach 
the Supreme Court involving both the resolution of statutory rights as well as a claim between a business 
and a consumer.  
4.  See id.  
5.  As the Supreme Court became more favorable towards arbitration, more and more 
companies began to require arbitration of employment claims. The landmark case in which the Supreme 
Court blessed the use of arbitration to resolve statutory employment claims was Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The Gilmer case involved a claim of age 
discrimination in Gilmer’s work as a broker/dealer in the securities industry. 
6.  Class action arbitration began gaining traction around the turn of the twenty-first century. 
The first case dealing with a class action issue reached the Supreme Court in 2003. See Green Tree Fin. 
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).  
7.  In an article written contemporaneously with the passing of the FAA, Julius Henry Cohen 
and Kenneth Dayton describe the FAA as a “necessity” for “American business” to have cost-effective 
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equipped to deal with the intricacies that have arisen in these areas of 
arbitration law. 
Given the changes in arbitration practice over time, unsurprisingly, 
some congresspersons have attempted to amend the FAA. Most notably, 
Congress considered variations of a bill, colloquially titled the Arbitration 
Fairness Act (AFA), between 2007 and 2018, that would invalidate pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in the consumer, employment, and franchise 
contexts, as well as certain types of civil rights disputes.8 In 2019, Congress 
considered the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act (FAIR Act), similar 
to the AFA, but also including a prohibition on class-action waivers.9 These 
bills, however, have not progressed out of committee and have not been 
passed into law. Congress appears equally unwilling to pursue less 
sweeping legislation that would regulate arbitration, as opposed to bar it 
outright.10  
Despite Congress’s inability to reform arbitration practice as a whole, it 
has been able to pass arbitration legislation in limited areas. In the Dodd-
Frank Act, for instance, Congress prohibited the use of pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements in residential mortgage contracts.11 Amidst the Jamie 
Leigh Jones sexual assault controversy,12 former senator Al Franken (who 
 
Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265 (1926). Further, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 249 
(2011), Justice Scalia stated that “class arbitration was not even envisioned by Congress when it passed 
the FAA in 1925,” and argued that anything other than bilateral arbitration interferes with the 
“fundamental attributes of arbitration,” id. at 344. Compared with non-unionized workplaces, collective 
bargaining agreements have a long history of including arbitration procedures as part of their grievance 
processes. The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act provides an enforcement mechanism for labor arbitration. See 
MAUREEN WESTON, KRISTEN BLANKLEY, JILL GROSS & STEPHEN K. HUBER, ARBITRATION: LAW, 
POLICY, AND PRACTICE 27 (2018).  
8.  See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, 114th Cong. (2015). 
9.  Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act of 2019, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. § 402(a) (2019). 
10.  Academics have suggested for years that regulating arbitration through amendments to the 
FAA might ease concerns about the process. See, e.g., Thomas V. Burch, Regulating Mandatory 
Arbitration, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2011) (proposing a compromise solution that Congress 
allow mandatory arbitration, provided that stricter regulation also be allowed). 
11.  15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e) (2012) (“No residential mortgage loan . . . may include terms which 
require arbitration or any other nonjudicial procedure as the method for resolving any controversy or 
settling any claims arising out of the transaction.”). 
12.  Jamie Leigh Jones worked for KBR, which was a subsidiary of Halliburton, as an 
administrative assistant. She worked in Iraq and lived in housing provided by her employer. In July 
2005, she claimed that she had been gang raped, and she attempted to sue Halliburton in court, despite 
the presence of an arbitration agreement in her employment contract. She won a protracted legal battle 
regarding whether she could present her case to an arbitrator or a jury, and she had her day in court in 
2011. See Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming a ruling by the district 
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also proposed the AFA each year) proposed an amendment—which 
passed—to an appropriations bill that would bar funding of military 
contractors that use pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their employment 
contracts.13  
With Congress virtually unable to act in the area of wholesale 
arbitration reform, some federal agencies are now attempting to regulate 
arbitration within their own areas of expertise.14 In some instances, 
Congress gave the agency specific authorization to consider arbitration.15 In 
other instances, agencies appear to be considering arbitration regulations on 
their own initiative. 
An agency’s willingness to tread into this ground varies significantly 
from administration to administration. During Barack Obama’s presidency, 
a number of agencies attempted to limit companies’ ability to require 
arbitration in some consumer and employment contracts. For example, the 
U.S. Department of Education promulgated a final regulation that went into 
effect on July 1, 2017, prohibiting colleges and universities from entering 
into a pre-dispute arbitration agreement with direct-loan borrowers.16 
Additionally, the Department of Education prohibited colleges and 
universities from requiring students to sign a waiver of the right to proceed 
as a class action.17 The Federal Communications Commission received 
 
court that many of her claims were not arbitrable).  Ultimately, the jury did not believe Jones’ allegations 
of rape and rendered a complete defense verdict. Texas: Jury Rejects Assertion of Rape Against Military 
Contractor in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2011, at A13.  
13.  Jamie Leigh Jones testified before Congress in 2007 in support of this amendment. The 
amendment passed sixty-eight to thirty in 2009, the first year that the amendment was proposed. See 
Cynthia Dizikes, Senate Passes Franken Amendment Aimed at Defense Contractors, MINNPOST (Oct. 
6, 2009), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2009/10/senate-passes-franken-amendment-
aimed-defense-contractors/ [https://perma.cc/A6KR-B9Y5]. As an amendment to an appropriations bill, 
this requirement must be re-enacted each year to remain in effect.  
14.  See Daniel T. Deacon, Agencies and Arbitration, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 993 (2017) 
(noting that agencies’ abilities to amass evidence and reflect on issues within their area of expertise make 
them a prime candidate for promulgating rules relating to arbitration within their field). 
15.  The Dodd-Frank Act established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and gave the 
agency the ability to study and create rules regarding arbitration. 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(1) (2012) (creating 
research unit); 12 U.S.C. § 5496(c) (requiring reports to Congress on the agency’s rules and studies); 12 
U.S.C. § 5518 (“The Bureau shall conduct a study of, and shall provide a report to Congress concerning, 
the use of agreements providing for arbitration of any future dispute between covered persons and 
consumers in connection with the offering or providing of consumer financial products or services.”). 
16.  34 C.F.R. § 685.300 (2017). These regulations went into effect and are discussed in more 
detail below in Section III.A. 
17.  Id.; see also Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal 
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pressure to promulgate regulations banning pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in consumer contracts for cellular telephone services, although 
no specific proposal was ever made.18 The Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) twice promulgated rules hostile to arbitration, 
which will be discussed in further detail below.  
Since the election of President Donald Trump, many anti-arbitration 
rules have either been abandoned or reversed.19 Perhaps the most visible 
political debate over agency regulation of arbitration was regarding the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) rule that would prohibit 
class action waivers in pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer 
financial contracts. Although the rule was finalized, Congress exercised its 
ability to overturn the rule under the Congressional Review Act.20 After the 
resolution passed the House, the Senate passed it fifty-one to fifty, with Vice 
President Mike Pence casting the deciding vote to overturn the CFPB rule.21 
Although the political climate can be more or less hostile to arbitration 
depending on the administration, the increased attention to arbitration by 
federal agencies will likely continue into the future. 
 
Assistance for College and Higher Education Grant Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 7592675, (Nov. 1, 2016) (to 
be codified at scattered sections of 34 C.F.R.); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of 
Education Announces Final Regulations to Protect Students and Taxpayers from Predatory Institutions 
(Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-announces-final-
regulations-protect-students-and-taxpayers-predatory-institutions [https://perma.cc/5EHE-9GXK]. 
18.  Various news outlets and special interest groups have reported on these types of proposals. 
See, e.g., Bryan Koenig, Privacy Groups Want FCC to Ban Mandatory Arbitration, LAW360 (Jan. 12, 
2017, 4:57 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/880361/privacy-groups-want-fcc-to-ban-mandatory-
arbitration [https://perma.cc/L3WS-U6Y3] (discussing the type of ban, as well as the political 
practicalities of such ban coming into effect); Letter from Lisa Gilbert, Dir., Cong. Watch Div., Pub. 
Citizen, to Mignon Clyburn, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://www.fcc.gov/file/11941/download [https:perma.cc/4R73-QVA8] (discussing pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts).  
19.  In some cases, the reversal of agency positions regarding arbitration has led to dismissals of 
litigation regarding the regulations or abandonment of claims in support of limitations on arbitration and 
class actions. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 385 
(5th Cir. 2018) (noting that the Department of Labor “disavowed” certain financial regulations that 
would limit class actions and implicate arbitration following the change in administration). 
20.  See Nicholas Denny, Angela Cipolla, Hilal Gulseven Cayirli & Russ Bleemer, The Worker’s 
View: Why the NLRB Was Correct in Declaring Mandatory Employment Arbitration Illegal, 35 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 165, 165 (2017). 












14            Washington University Journal of Law and Policy        [Vol. 63 
 
Ultimately, this article asks: What happens if an agency promulgates a 
law hostile to arbitration? How should the courts treat such an attempt? The 
law is relatively clear on dealing with conflicts between the FAA and 
statutes hostile to arbitration, but the law is only beginning to develop when 
a conflict exists between the FAA and a federal regulation. This article 
proposes a framework for dealing with this emerging issue, particularly 
given congressional inaction and increased political pressure to reform 
arbitration. This Article, however, makes no substantive judgments 
regarding the value of any particular regulation, and this opening narrative 
only intends to show why agencies are attempting to do what Congress 
politically cannot.  
This article predicts the Supreme Court will extend the now well-
established rule for a conflict between the FAA and a federal statute to the 
area of agency regulations. Instead of simply detecting a conflict between 
the FAA and the regulation, however, this article predicts that the Supreme 
Court, and thereafter lower courts, will apply this rule to the enabling 
legislation to determine if the FAA or the agency rule should apply. This 
rule has some significant benefits, such as preserving the policies 
underlying the FAA, reading federal statutes together, and preventing 
overreaching by agencies. This article also considers a competing model 
under which a court would compare the FAA and the regulation together, 
but only after considering whether the regulation was properly promulgated.  
The question covered herein is similar to, but distinct from, the question 
presented in Epic Systems v. Lewis.22 The Epic Systems Court considered 
whether companies could include class-action waivers in arbitration 
agreements with their employees.23 At issue were both statutory language 
and regulatory authority hostile to arbitration. The Epic Systems Court, by 
dealing solely with the statutory question (i.e., enforcing arbitration 
agreements under the FAA and protecting “concerted activity”24 in the labor 
context) left open the question of how courts should consider anti-
arbitration regulatory law. Although the Court gives some guidance on this 
issue,25 that guidance is arguably dicta. This article, by contrast, focuses 
squarely on the intersection of regulatory law and arbitration law. 
 
22.  138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
23.  Id. 
24.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (providing a right to engage in concerted labor activity). 
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Surprisingly few scholars have closely examined the relationship 
between the FAA and federal administrative regimes. Professor Maureen 
Weston noted many of these questions in her article, “The Clash: Squaring 
Mandatory Arbitration with Administrative Agency and Representative 
Recourse,” which was one of the first articles on the topic.26 Professor 
Weston’s article focuses primarily on adjudicatory agency proceedings, 
while this article considers both rule-based and adjudicatory proceedings, 
also building on the lessons learned from Epic Systems. Other scholars have 
considered the propriety of agencies promulgating arbitration regulations, 
usually while assuming the authority to do so.27 Further, a handful of articles 
have made some reference to the conflict between the FAA and anti-
arbitration regulations,28 but most of these articles consider the conflict in a 
very specific industry. More recently, Professor David Noll, in his article 
“Arbitration Conflicts,”29 and Professor Daniel Deacon, in his essay, 
“Agencies and Arbitration,”30 have begun a conversation on this issue, 
particularly in the wake of Epic Systems and Obama-era anti-arbitration 
regulations. This article seeks to build on these ideas, considering them from 
a new lens and setting forth a new rule for courts to consider.31 While 
Professors Noll and Deacon approach these issues from the lens of 
administrative law, this article focuses on the lens of arbitration law.  
 
26.  Maureen A. Weston, The Clash: Squaring Mandatory Arbitration with Administrative 
Agency and Representative Recourse, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 103 (2015). In addition, Professor Weston has 
written extensively on the topic of preemption of state administrative laws. See, e.g., Maureen A. 
Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute: The Federal Arbitration Act and Displacement of Agency 
Regulation, 5 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 59 (2013) (discussing expansive preemption by the FAA and 
urging Congress to amend the FAA to limit the preemptive power of the Act). 
27.  See Deacon, supra note 14. 
28.  See, e.g., Arpan A. Sura & Robert A. DeRise, Conceptualizing Concepcion: The Continuing 
Viability of Arbitration Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 403, 421-422, 477-85 (2013) (proving an 
overview of ways that Concepcion may implicate federal law hostile to arbitration); Clint Hale, Note, 
The Great and Powerful FAA: Why Schwab’s Class Action Waiver Should Have Been Enforced Over 
FINRA’s Rules, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 109 (2014) (discussing the intersection of the FAA and FINRA rules).  
29.  David L. Noll, Arbitration Conflicts, 103 MINN. L. REV. 665 (2018). 
30.  Deacon, supra note 14. Professor Deacon more recently authored an essay giving an 
administrative law perspective on these issues. Daniel T. Deacon, Federal Common Law Versus Agency 
Power: An Essay on Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 141. 
31.  See generally Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Investor Protection Meets the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1 (2012) (analyzing potential conflicts between the FAA 
and FINRA arbitration practice); Kenneth T. Lopatka, A Critical Perspective on the Interplay Between 
Our Federal Labor and Arbitration Laws, 63 S.C. L. REV. 45 (2011) (discussing the intersection of the 
FAA with the NLRB). 
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The renewed interest in federal agency regulation of arbitration makes 
this topic worth exploring in greater detail. Although the interest in anti-
arbitration regulation ebbs and flows based on political control of those 
agencies, this article develops a framework for examining those regulations 
based on current arbitration law.  
In Part I, this article traces the historical roots of how Supreme Court 
handles conflicts between FAA and contrary federal statutes, with the 
discussion divided between the Wilko v. Swan era and the contemporary era. 
Part II proposes two analytical models for determining whether an anti-
arbitration regulation would survive court scrutiny. Part III gives examples 
on how future cases can be resolved under these frameworks, and the 
conclusion predicts that the courts will likely invalidate regulations hostile 
to arbitration without clear indication from Congress that the agency has 
permission to abridge the FAA. 
 
I. FAA AND COMPETING FEDERAL STATUTES 
 
Part I of this article considers the foundational question of conflict 
between the FAA and other federal statutes. Because agency regulations 
must ultimately trace back to enabling legislation, this analysis provides a 
legal backdrop to considering the role of agency regulations dealing with 
arbitration. This section highlights the role of agencies, as appropriate. 
 
A. The Wilko v. Swan Era 
 
Early U.S. courts consistently held that statutory claims could not be 
arbitrated, as evidenced by Wilko v. Swan.32 Wilko involved a rather garden-
variety claim of a violation of the Securities Act of 1933 based on 
misrepresentations made during the sale of securities.33 The parties’ 
agreement included an arbitration clause, which the broker/dealer sought to 
enforce.34 The consumer argued that claims under the Securities Act could 
not be arbitrated for two reasons: first, because Congress created a statutory 
 
32.  346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
33.  Id. at 428-29. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the broker/dealer made positive 
statements about and encouraged the consumer to purchase stock in Air Associates all the while not 
disclosing that a director and legal counselor for Air Associates was selling his own stock (some of 
which the consumer purchased). Id. 
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cause of action, and second, because the Securities Act included an “anti-
waiver” provision, so attempts to waive compliance with the right to litigate 
would be void.35 The broker/dealer argued that arbitration was merely an 
alternative forum—not a waiver of rights.36  
The Court expressed the “desirability of arbitration as an alternative to 
the complications of litigation” and as a means to avoid “delay and 
expense.”37 The majority noted arbitration’s “usefulness” in resolving cases 
“based on statutes.”38 Despite these broad generalizations regarding 
arbitration’s benefits and utility, the Court found the dispute not arbitrable, 
relying on textual and policy reasons.39 
As to the consumer’s first argument, the Court found that the “anti-
waiver” provision included the right to a judicial forum. The Court stated 
that if a buyer  
waives his right to sue in courts, he gives up more than 
would a participant in other business transactions . . . He 
thus surrenders one of the advantages the Act gives him and 
surrenders it at a time when he is less able to judge the 
weight of the handicap the Securities Act places upon his 
adversary.40  
The Court, however, leaves this statement as a bare assertion and does not 
discuss or cite any legal principles on the conflict-of-laws issue.  
As to the consumer’s second argument, the Court relied on policy 
considerations. The Wilko Court appears to hold that arbitrators are ill-
equipped to deal with legal claims. The Court expressed concern that 
arbitrators would be “without judicial instruction on the law,” leading to bad 
 
35.  Id. at 430 (“The question is whether an agreement to arbitrate a future controversy is a 
‘condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with 
any provision’ of the Securities Act which § 14 declares ‘void.’”).  
36.  Id. at 433 (“Respondent asserts that arbitration is merely a form of trial to be used in lieu of 
a trial at law, and therefore no conflict exists between the Securities Act and the United States Arbitration 
Act either in their language or in the congressional purposes in their enactment.”). This argument later 
wins the day when the Court overrules Wilko. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 
220, 228-29 (1987) (retreating from Wilko). 
37.  Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431. 
38.  Id. at 432 (citing circuit court cases). 
39.  Id. at 438. 
40.  Id. at 435. Justice Jackson concurred, noting that parties could freely choose to arbitrate after 
a dispute arose, but this contract involved a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Id. at 438-39 (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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decisions.41 Arbitrators may not understand “burden[s] of proof,” 
“reasonable care,” and “material fact[s].”42 Because arbitrators need not 
issue reasoned awards, errors in legal reasoning may not be obvious.43 
Further, the “[p]ower to vacate an award is limited.”44 These concerns are 
essentially paternalistic, based on the idea that consumers cannot be 
adequately protected by arbitrators who may or may not be lawyers. As a 
practical matter, following Wilko, statutory claims were generally not 
arbitrable.45  
This case included some interesting agency dynamics. Although Wilko 
dealt with the Securities Act, as opposed to a Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regulation, the SEC appeared in Wilko as amicus 
curiae.46 The SEC received special leave of Court to appear in the action 
and “share[ the consumer’s] burden” in the case.47 The Court appeared to 
show interest in and deference to the agency’s interpretation of its enabling 
legislation through the SEC’s special role in the litigation. The SEC argued 
in its amicus filing that arbitration violated the anti-wavier provision of the 






41.  Id. at 436. 
42.  Id. In the dissent, Justice Frankfurter noted that arbitrators would not be free to simply 
disregard the law when ruling on statutory claims. Id. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Arbitrators 
may not disregard the law.”).  
43.  Id. at 436 (“As their award may be made without explanation of their reasons and without a 
complete record of their proceedings, the arbitrators’ conception of the legal meaning of such statutory 
requirements as ‘burden of proof,’ ‘reasonable care’ or ‘material fact,’ cannot be examined.”). 
44.  Id. 
45.  See, e.g., EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN E. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. 
WARE, ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA 129 (2006) (“The Wilko decision no doubt discouraged 
businesses from seeking to impose arbitration on consumers in other contexts as well [i.e., outside of 
securities].”). Professor Carbonneau describes Wilko as a “classic example” of the Court acting hostilely 
to arbitration, and he also focuses on the Wilko Court mistrusting of arbitrators to understand the law 
and rule accordingly. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, TOWARD A NEW FEDERAL LAW ON ARBITRATION 556-
57 (2014).  
46.  Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428, at n.*. 
47.  Id. The SEC appeared on behalf of the consumer starting at the district court. See Wilko v. 
Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev’d, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953). 
48.  See generally Brief for the Securities & Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae supporting 
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B. Modern View 
 
The Wilko era lasted roughly thirty-five years. By the late 1980s, the 
Supreme Court overruled its textual and policy justifications on the issue of 
arbitrability of statutory claims. Some of these cases involved federal 
agencies, although the amount of deference given to those agencies wanes 
over time with no discussion.  
 
1. The Mitsubishi-McMahon-Rodriguez-Gilmer Quartet 
 
The death knell for Wilko rang in mid-1980s. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 
v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,49 and Shearson/American Express Inc. v. 
McMahon50 put into motion a series of cases reversing Wilko’s textual and 
policy justifications. Reviewing McMahon in conjunction with Rodriguez 
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc.51 and Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.52 gives the most robust picture of the change 
in tide. Other than Mitsubishi, all of these cases arose in the securities 
industry—an industry that widely adopted arbitration practice despite 
Wilko’s holding. 
The Mitsubishi case enforced the parties’ pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement although the underlying dispute concerned claims under the 
Sherman Act.53 Although the Mitsubishi case concerned two business 
entities, the Court mandated arbitration despite the complex statutory 
scheme regarding anticompetitive behavior. McMahon involved alleged 
violations of the Exchange Act between consumers and broker/dealers in 
the context of contracts including arbitration clauses.54 Unlike Wilko, the 
McMahon Court stated: “The Arbitration Act, standing alone, . . . mandates 
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims,”55 and explained: 
 
49.  473 U.S. 614 (1985).  
50.  482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
51.  490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
52.  500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
53.  473 U.S. at 628-29; see also Kenneth F. Dunham, Southland Corp. v. Keating Revisited: 
Twenty-Five Years in Which Direction?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 331, 349-50 (2010) (tracing the effects 
of Southland Corp. v. Keating on claims involving federal statutes).  
54.  482 U.S. at 223. 
55.  Id. at 226. 
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Like any statutory directive, the Arbitration Act’s mandate 
may be overridden by a contrary congressional command. 
The burden is on the party opposing arbitration, however, 
to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of 
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. If 
Congress did intend to limit or prohibit waiver of a judicial 
forum for a particular claim, such an intent “will be 
deducible from [the statute's] text or legislative history,” 
or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the 
statute's underlying purposes.56 
This holding is notable for two reasons.57 First, the Court places a very 
high burden of proof on the party opposing arbitration. Second, the Court 
requires that party to point to something in the statute’s text, legislative 
history, or purpose showing that Congress did not intend for claims under 
that statute to be arbitrated. As a practical matter, Congress may be 
presumed to rely on Wilko and the historical view that statutory claims were 
not appropriate for arbitration up to that point in time, so the Court’s new 
rule would result in arbitration of all (or nearly all) of claims falling under 
a statute because Congress would not have considered adding such language 
to its statutes.58   
In McMahon, the Court easily found that the consumers did not meet 
this heavy burden.59 In applying this new rule, the Court took aim at the twin 
justifications set forth by the Wilko Court. The McMahon Court did not 
construe the right-to-sue provision as being strictly subject to the “anti-
 
56.  Id. at 226-27 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628). 
57.  In addition to creating these two important structural changes to arbitration law, the Supreme 
Court also created a new label for the rule—the “contrary congressional command” rule. Although the 
Court does not use this language again for almost two decades, more recent Supreme Court—and lower 
court—cases rely on this language in trying to read other federal statutes with the FAA. See, e.g., 
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012) (citing language); Walthour v. Chipio 
Windshield Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 2014) (analyzing the “contrary congressional 
command inquiry”). 
58.  Over time, of course, this argument diminishes. Once Congress is on notice of the need to 
include language relating to arbitration, Congress’ lack of arbitration language can be argued to be 
intentional. 
59.  482 U.S. at 238 (“We conclude, therefore, that Congress did not intend for § 29(a) to bar 
enforcement of all predispute arbitration agreements. In this case, where the SEC has sufficient statutory 
authority to ensure that arbitration is adequate to vindicate Exchange Act rights, enforcement” of 
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waiver” provision.60 Instead, the Court indicated that the parties will still 
maintain their statutory rights, only those rights would be enforced by an 
arbitrator—not a judge.61 Further, the Court also rejected the idea that 
arbitrators are incapable of determining statutory claims: 
Indeed, most of the reasons given in Wilko have been 
rejected subsequently by the Court as a basis for holding 
claims to be nonarbitrable. In Mitsubishi, for example, we 
recognized that arbitral tribunals are readily capable of 
handling the factual and legal complexities of antitrust 
claims, notwithstanding the absence of judicial instruction 
and supervision. Likewise, we have concluded that the 
streamlined procedures of arbitration do not entail any 
consequential restriction on substantive rights. Finally, we 
have indicated that there is no reason to assume at the outset 
that arbitrators will not follow the law; although judicial 
scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such 
review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with 
the requirements of the statute.62  
As in Wilko, the SEC appeared as amicus curiae, but in McMahon, the 
SEC supported the side of the broker/dealers—not the consumer.63 The 
Court positively cited the SEC’s “expansive power to ensure the adequacy 
of the arbitration procedures” initiated by the stock exchanges administering 
the arbitrations.64 The Supreme Court did not cite any provision of the 
Securities Act that gives the SEC the power to regulate arbitration, but it 
does cite to the SEC’s general oversight over the self-regulatory 
organizations (SROs).65  
Five years after McMahon, the Supreme Court expressly overruled 
Wilko in Rodriguez.66 The Rodriguez Court unsurprisingly found that the 
 
60.  Id. at 228-29 (discussing the effect of Wilko). 
61.  Id. at 229 (holding that “where arbitration does provide an adequate means of enforcing the 
provisions of the Exchange Act, § 29(a) does not void a predispute waiver of § 27). The Court relies on 
Mitsubishi, holding that, “[o]rdinarily, ‘by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo 
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than 
a judicial, forum.’” Id. at 228-29 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).  
62.  Id. at 232. 
63.  Id. at 233-34. 
64.  Id. at 233. 
65.  Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78s). 
66.  Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989). 
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Wilko holding interpreting the Securities Act could not stand side-by-side 
with the McMahan ruling interpreting the Exchange Act.67  
The Gilmer case reiterates the McMahon holding, but the language goes 
farther to support arbitration, dismissing the notion that arbitrators are inept 
or provide inferior dispute resolution. Robert Gilmer asserted an Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act68 violation against his employer, a 
securities firm.69 He claimed his Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) claim was not arbitrable under his contract.70   
Finding nothing in the text or legislative history of the ADEA relating 
to arbitration, Gilmer unsuccessfully argued that the purposes of the ADEA 
were “inconsistent” with the FAA.71 Gilmer recited a litany of reasons why 
arbitration was inadequate, but the Court rejected each one—in stark 
contrast with the policy arguments articulated in Wilko. Specifically, the 
Court determined that the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules 
“provide protection against biased panels,”72 that “NYSE discovery 
provisions”73 adequately give the parties the ability to develop and present 
their cases, that “arbitration awards [would] be in writing”74 under the 
NYSE rules, that arbitrators “have the power to fashion equitable relief,”75 
and that class remedies might still be available to Gilmer.76 The Court 
further rejected any argument that arbitration was inappropriate given the 
disparity in bargaining power between employer and employee.77 In other 
words, the Court validated arbitrators’ abilities to manage complex cases 
fairly.  
 
67.  Id. at 484 (“It also would be undesirable for the decisions in Wilko and McMahon to continue 
to exist side by side. Their inconsistency is at odds with the principle that the 1933 and 1934 Acts should 
be construed harmoniously.”). 
68.  Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-629, 634 (2012). 
69.  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).  
70.  Technically, the arbitration agreement at issue was between Gilmer and the New York Stock 
Exchange, which had a rule that required arbitration of all claims between “any member or member 
organization arising out of the employment or termination of employment of such registered 
representative.” Id.  
71.  Id. at 27. 
72.  Id. at 30. 
73.  Id. at 31. 
74.  Id.  
75.  Id. at 32. 
76.  Id. 
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In many ways, Gilmer was an easy case. Arguably, Congress, in passing 
the ADEA in 1967, would not have considered any need to address 
arbitration because Wilko was current law at the time.78 In addition, by the 
1990s, securities arbitration was well developed. The Court repeatedly 
endorsed the specific NYSE rules as adequate and fair. Although the SEC 
did not participate in Gilmer, the SEC had significant regulatory authority 
over the NYSE and its dispute resolution process. Despite taking an easy 
case, the Court did not limit the holding to securities cases or other cases 
involving relatively sophisticated employees. These three cases set the legal 
landscape for widespread arbitration to resolve statutory claims in contracts 
between businesses, between businesses and employees, and between 
businesses and consumers. Although these holdings remain largely 
unchanged, they are still controversial.79  
 
2. Modern Application of the New Rule 
 
The last two decades have seen widespread arbitrability of statutory 
claims, and many of the leading Supreme Court cases have agency 
implications. Between 2012 and 2019, the Court decided three cases 
regarding the arbitrability of federal claims. Although most arbitration 
scholars would characterize these as “class action arbitration” cases, the 
Court clarified and expanded the “contrary congressional command” rule 
first articulated in McMahon. 
First, in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,80 the Supreme Court 
elaborated on the meaning of a “contrary congressional command.” 
CompuCredit considered whether cases involving alleged violations of the 
Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA)81 could be arbitrated. Plaintiff 
credit cardholders filed a class action lawsuit against CompuCredit under 
the CROA for allegedly making false statements regarding the card’s ability 
 
78.  In addition, an open question existed until 2001 as to whether employment-related disputes 
could be arbitrated at all. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (interpreting 
an exclusion of “any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” in 9 U.S.C. § 1 
as applying only to transportation workers). 
79.  Dunham, supra note 53, at 354 (noting that “Gilmer thus expanded the scope of the FAA 
into employee-employer claims and civil rights claims, two areas of the law where arbitration had been 
an unwelcome guest”).  
80.  565 U.S. 95 (2012). 
81.  15 U.S.C. § 1679 (2012). 
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to repair credit.82 The card agreement included an arbitration clause,83 but 
the parties disputed whether the CROA claim could be arbitrated.  
Citing McMahon, the Court articulated the “contrary congressional 
command” rule,84 and rejected the cardholders’ argument (similar to the 
argument made by Gilmer) that the CROA gave them an unwaivable right 
to sue.85 Instead, the Court limited the right under the CROA to “the right 
to receive” a certain disclosure statement, “which is meant to describe the 
consumer protections that the law elsewhere provides.”86 The Court again 
rejected the argument that the statutory language creating a cause of action, 
and even contemplating class actions, was a “contrary congressional 
command” under McMahon and Gilmer.87 The Court further stated that it 
had “repeatedly recognized that contractually required arbitration of claims 
satisfies the statutory prescription of civil liability in court,”88 noting that if 
Congress had wanted to prohibit the arbitration of these disputes, it could 
have done so in the text of the statute.89 
Second, in the 2013 case of American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant,90 the Supreme Court considered whether a class-action waiver 
provision in a contract between American Express and certain franchisees 
was permissible. The franchisees argued that the antitrust laws provided a 
contrary congressional command to allow them to proceed as a class in 
court. The Court, favorably citing CompuCredit, rejected the franchisees’ 
argument.91 Because the Sherman and Clayton Acts “make no mention of 
 
82.  CompuCredit, 565 U.S. at 97. 
83.  Id. (The credit card application form stated that “any claim, dispute or controversy (whether 
in contract, tort, or otherwise) at any time arising from or relating to your Account, any transferred 
balances or this Agreement (collectively, ‘Claims’), upon the election of you or us, will be resolved by 
binding arbitration.”). 
84.  Id. at 98 (citing Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)). 
85.  Id. at 99 (noting that a violation of the non-waiver provision would be “void.”). 
86.  Id. 
87.  Id. at 101-02 (citing McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 
(1985)). 
88.  Id. at 101 (emphasis added). 
89.  Id. at 103. The dissent relied highly on the combination of the “right to sue” and anti-waiver 
language. Id. at 113 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the non-waiver language of the 
CROA was sufficiently different from the language in the other cases, such as McMahon, to be able to 
distinguish this case from the others. Id. at 115. 
90.  570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
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class actions,”92 they did not evidence such a contrary congressional 
command. The Court further rejected the franchisees’ argument that the 
advent of Rule 23 five decades later created such a congressional 
command.93    
Most recently, the Court addressed this issue in Epic Systems Corp. v. 
Lewis.94 Epic Systems considered the conflict between the FAA and the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) regarding the ability for workers to 
proceed as a class action in court, as opposed to bilateral arbitration.95 The 
Court appeared to modify the McMahon rule by holding that the employees 
must show a “clear and manifest congressional command” in the NLRA to 
displace the FAA.96 The addition of “clear and manifest” arguably creates 
an even higher burden than existed before,97 but the rule is too new to 
determine whether this burden is, in fact, higher than the previously 
articulated “contrary congressional command” rule. 
The Court found that no such command existed. The court read the 
“concerted activity” language of the NLRA to protect workers’ rights to join 
unions and bargain collectively—but not to engage in class action 
lawsuits.98 In addition, the Court rejected the argument that class action 
litigation falls within the “catchall” phrase at the end of Section 7.99 Epic 
 
92.  Id. at 234. 
93.  Id. at 234-35. Although outside the scope of this article, the Italian Colors Court notably 
rejected the franchisees’ argument that they could not effectively vindicate their statutory rights due to 
the prohibitive costs of proceeding individually. Id. at 235-39.  
94.  138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
95.  Id. at 1623-24. The NLRA provides employees with the right to “form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Id. 
at 1624 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157). 
96.  Id. (emphasis added). The use of the “clear and manifest” language is new to the arbitration 
cases. This language appears to come from the rule regarding the doctrine of implied repeal. The cases 
cited by the Court supporting the “clear and manifest” rule both involve the implied repeal of one statute 
by a later-enacted statute. Id. (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); United States. v. Fausto, 
484 U.S. 439 (1988)). 
97.  To date, one court cited the new test. In California Ass’n of Private Postsecondary Schools 
v. DeVos, No. 17-999, 2020 WL 516455, at *13 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2020), the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia, however, did not find a conflict between the regulation at issue and the FAA, so 
the court did not need to apply the test.  
98.  Epic Systems, 138 S.Ct. at 1628-29. The Court noted that this ruling should not “come as a 
surprise,” given that the right to proceed as a class action did not exist under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure for approximately thirty years after the passage of the NLRA. Id. at 1627. 
99.  Id. at 1625-27. 
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Systems favorably cites Gilmer,100 and noted that “this Court has rejected 
every such effort [to show a conflict between a federal statute and the FAA] 
to date . . . , with statutes ranging from the Sherman and Clayton Acts to the 
[ADEA], the [CROA], the Securities Act . . ., the . . . Exchange Act,” and 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.101  
Unlike these other cases mentioned, Epic Systems is the first to discuss 
the relationship between the FAA and Chevron deference to agency rules, 
although that discussion is arguably dicta.102 As discussed in more detail 
below, the Court rejected the notion that it should give deference to the 
National Labor Relation Board’s (NLRB) determination on the meaning of 
the NLRA.103 The end result of this case is another instance of the Court 
reading two federal statutes together to enforce arbitration agreements in 
areas that implicate federal law.   
These cases show a clear trend towards finding statutory causes of 
action arbitrable as a way to give effect to both the FAA and the statute 
creating the underlying cause of action. Understanding the analysis of 
conflicts between the FAA and other federal laws is fundamental to 
predicting the analysis that courts will use when construing agency 
regulations hostile to arbitration. 
 
II. ANALYZING AGENCY REGULATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE FAA 
 
The Supreme Court has yet to explicitly rule on the question of how to 
deal with a conflict between the FAA and a federal agency regulation that 
is hostile to arbitration. The recent decision in Epic Systems suggests an 
answer, but Epic’s holding is more closely aligned with Gilmer and its 
progeny than forging new ground affecting administrative law. 
 
100.  Id. at 1627-28 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991)). 
101.  Id. at 1627 (citing, inter alia, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013); 
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)). 
102.  Id. at 1629-30.  
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Of course, the Supreme Court ruled that state agency regulations hostile 
to arbitration are preempted.104 In 1984, in Southland Corp. v. Keating,105 
the Supreme Court first held that the FAA preempts conflicting state law. 
Most of the early cases involved legislative attempts to invalidate pre-
dispute arbitration agreements.106 In Preston v. Ferrer,107 the Court 
extended the FAA’s preemption to include state agency actions. Although 
Preston concerned an agency action that precluded enforcement of a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement, it is inapplicable to this discussion because it 
concerned state-level regulations, which are clearly preempted. The 
remainder of this Article covers federal-level agency rules, which likely fall 
under the McMahon and Gilmer line of cases. How those cases apply is yet 
to be determined. 
Scholarly discussion on this topic is only now emerging. Professor 
Daniel Deacon authored a lengthy essay on the role of agencies in 
arbitration, focusing primarily the role of agencies in regulating 
arbitration.108 Professor Deacon rightfully notes that an agency regulation 
could regulate or eliminate arbitration provided that “[s]uch regulation may 
be grounded in either an express delegation from Congress to regulate 
 
104.  Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349-50 (2008) (“The instant petition presents the following 
question: Does the FAA override not only state statutes that refer certain state-law controversies initially 
to a judicial forum, but also state statutes that refer certain disputes initially to an administrative agency? 
We hold today that, when parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, state laws 
lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial or administrative, are superseded by the 
FAA.”). 
105.  465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
106.  See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006); Doctor's 
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 684–685 (1996); Allied–Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 
U.S. 265, 272 (1995). 
107.  552 U.S. at 353. Despite private arbitration agreements between parties, agencies still retain 
their own ability to enforce statutes in their own name. The Supreme Court recognized that agencies are 
not third-party beneficiaries to private arbitration agreements, and thus are not bound by those contracts. 
In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002), the Court held that that the FAA does not “require 
the agency to relinquish its statutory authority if it has not agreed to do so,” thus allowing the agency to 
proceed with its own investigation and adjudication alongside the arbitration between the employer and 
the employee. Id. at 294. Under Waffle House, agencies can use their own enforcement powers to remedy 
wrongs, usually committed by corporations, regardless of private agreements to arbitrate that may 
already be in existence. Those enforcement powers may be victim-specific, such as in Waffle House, or 
broader ranging. Professor Deacon suggests that agencies may use their own authority to secure large 
penalties against corporations that can be distributed to many consumers, employees, given the 
increasing use of class-action waivers in form contracts. In this way, the agency can proceed as an 
“agency class action,” even if the individual consumers, investors, or employees are otherwise 
contractually barred from doing so. Deacon, supra note 14, at 1008-09. 
108.  Id. at 1014. 
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arbitration specifically or an implied power that the agency holds.”109 His 
essay classifies regulations into a number of different categories and gives 
examples of agencies regulating arbitration.110  
Section II.A first considers a two-step approach of considering a 
conflict between the FAA and the enabling statute, followed by a Chevron 
analysis between the enabling legislation and the agency regulation. This 
approach would be consistent with the guidance from Epic Systems and 
harmonize potentially competing federal regulations with the FAA. This 
model is predictive of what the Supreme Court would do when faced with 
the question, because it is a natural extension of the “contrary congressional 
command” rule. Following recent Supreme Court precedent, this model 
would almost certainly invalidate any agency regulation hostile to 
arbitration unless the agency’s enabling legislation gives the agency specific 
powers to regulate arbitration in such a manner.  
Section II.A then considers a competing model—that of comparing the 
FAA directly with the anti-arbitration regulation. This second model would 
reverse the two steps, starting with an analysis of the authority for the 
regulation under the enabling legislation followed by an analysis between 
the regulation and the FAA. This model would create a new rule, labeled 
the “contrary regulatory command” rule. This second model would give 
significantly more power and deference to agencies, but its chances of 
adoption at the Supreme Court level appear slim.  
 
A. Two Models of Determining Whether Arbitration  
Agreements Should Be Enforced 
 
Consistent with existing precedent, this article predicts that courts will 
adopt a two-step approach to determine whether a federal regulation 
invalidating arbitration agreements should be enforced. This section 
predicts that the “contrary congressional command” rule would be most 
consistent with current arbitration law. However, this article also considers 
a competing model that might be more consistent with general norms of 
administrative law, giving deference to agencies in areas of their expertise.  
 
109.  Id. 
110.  Id. at 1014-21 (placing regulations into the following categories: information gathering; 
information forcing; regulations pursuant to express delegation; regulations pursuant to implied power; 
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Courts, to date, have not created a framework for considering the 
enforceability of regulations impacting arbitration. This article seeks to 
provide two frameworks, both of which have significant benefits and 
drawbacks. This section describes the two models, and then considers how 
norms of arbitration, administrative, and other law may shape a more robust 
answer to this problem.  
 
1. Extending the “Contrary Congressional Command”  
Rule for Agency Regulations of Arbitration 
 
Extending the “contrary congressional command” rule to agency 
regulations would require two steps. The first step would be to compare the 
FAA with applicable agency’s enabling legislation. The second step would 
be to conduct a more traditional agency analysis to determine whether the 
agency had the requisite authority to issue the regulation. Visually, this rule 
can be represented as follows:  
 
                
 
 
The rule is consistent with both arbitration law and, to a lesser extent, 
administrative law. Comparing the FAA to the enabling language in step 
one would preserve the Court’s “contrary congressional command” rule, 
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Although not explicit, the Supreme Court may have engaged in a similar 
analysis in Epic Systems. In Epic Systems, the Court primarily analyzed the 
question under what this article labels “step 1,” i.e., comparing the FAA 
with the NLRA.111 As noted above, the Court rejected the employees’ 
contention that the “concerted activity” language in the NLRA was broad 
enough to encompass class-action arbitration activities.112 Concluding that 
the NLRA and the FAA could be read together under the “contrary 
congressional command” rule, the Court secondarily found that the NLRB’s 
rulings invalidating class-action waivers could not be supported under the 
NLRA.113 Because the FAA and the NLRA could be read consistently by 
allowing contractual freedom for parties regarding arbitration matter, the 
Court did not need to address whether the NLRB should be afforded 
deference under administrative law. 
If the enabling legislation gives the agency the ability to decide 
arbitration matters, the second step would be to determine whether the 
agency properly promulgated the rule or decision under traditional 
administrative law principles. This article predicts that courts would be 
more likely to adopt this rule given today’s legal landscape favoring 
arbitration. Despite this advantage, competing policies demonstrate that this 
approach would forsake agency expertise in favor of pro-arbitration norms. 
 
2. Creation of a “Contrary Regulatory Command” Rule 
 
A second model for dealing with this question would be to first consider 
whether the agency has the proper authority to create the regulation, 
followed by an analysis of whether the regulation would be in conflict with 
the FAA. Rather than looking for a “contrary congressional command,” the 





111.  Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622-30 (2018) (discussing the text of the NLRA). 
112.  Id. at 1632. 
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Under this rule, even if the enabling legislation is silent on the issue of 
arbitration, a properly promulgated agency rule that undermines arbitration 
would stand. This model would treat agency regulations hostile to 
arbitration in the same manner as statutes that are hostile to arbitration. This 
model gives significantly more flexibility to agencies in regulating 
arbitration.  
An example of a case that appeared to follow this model (albeit 
imprecisely) is American Health Care Associates v. Burwell.114 This case, 
decided by the Northern District of Mississippi, concerned the validity of a 
rule promulgated by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
that would bar nursing homes from receiving federal funds if they enter into 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements with their residents.115  
The court began its arbitration analysis by considering whether a 
conflict existed between the FAA and the CMS regulation—not the 
 
114.  217 F. Supp. 3d 921 (N.D. Miss. 2016). 
115.  Id. at 925. The case arose as a declaratory judgment action seeking to enjoin the regulation 
prior to its scheduled effective date. Id. at 926. Originally, the regulation was set to go into effect on 
November 28, 2016. Id. In the first part of the opinion, the court expressed considerable hostility to the 
use of arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts. Id. at 926-28. Two of the court’s primary 
concerns were the possibility of nursing home residents lacking the capacity to enter into agreements to 
arbitrate, and the reality that litigation regarding arbitration issues significantly undermines the 
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enabling legislation.116 The court found that although the text of the rule 
deals with funding mechanisms, it “effectively amounts to a ban on pre-
dispute nursing home arbitration contacts” and should be “treated as what it 
effectively is (i.e. a de facto ban), in determining whether it conflicts with 
the FAA.”117 Although the court cited CompuCredit and gave lip service to 
the “contrary congressional command” rule, it did not decide whether this 
particular case called for an analysis under CompuCredit at the preliminary 
injunction stage.118 The court also invoked the circuit court decision in D.R. 
Horton v. NLRB (later upheld under Epic Systems), which specifically 
considered the conflict between the FAA and the NLRA.119 Despite the 
authority cited, the court ultimately ruled that the agency did not properly 
study arbitration or create its rule using proper process.120  
After the court considered an analysis comparing the FAA and the 
agency regulation, it proceeded to also consider whether the agency had 
authority to promulgate the regulation. It cited examples of statutes that 
expressly give agencies the authority to regulate arbitration.121 Although 
 
116.  Id. at 929 (“In determining which party is likely to prevail in this action, this court first 
addresses the issue of whether the Rule enacted by CMS in this case is barred by the FAA.”). The court 
even began the discussion by titling that portion of the opinion: “Likelihood of Success (a) Is the Rule 
barred by the Federal Arbitration Act?” Id. 
117.  Id. (emphasis added). 
118.  Id. at 932. (“This motion for preliminary injunction is not the proper occasion for this court 
to make a definitive choice between these competing arguments, but it does seem clear that CompuCredit 
presents further significant difficulties for defendants.”). The court also cites AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), which technically shouldn’t apply in this case because federal statutes 
cannot preempt other federal statutes or regulations. See id. at 931. A clash between two federal 
authorities should be conducted through a conflicts analysis, as opposed to a preemption analysis. 
Despite not being authoritative on the question, the court appears to be relying on the policy statements 
and general pronouncements as potentially influential. See id. 
119.  Id. at 932 (discussing the application of D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 
2013)). 
120.  Id. at 933 (“In the court’s view, accumulating and reading from public comments is a 
questionable method of proving anything, and yet most of CMS’ rationalization for banning arbitration 
was based on such comments, often from interested parties. Even assuming this is how CMS ordinarily 
conducts its business, a rule banning nursing home arbitration is not ordinary CMS business (assuming 
it has the authority to take this action at all). In the court’s view, it would have been far preferable for 
an agency with the resources of CMS to conduct its own independent and reliable investigation of issues 
relating to nursing home arbitration, in order to justify a step which, it must have known, would raise 
serious concerns in light of the FAA.”). 
121.  Id. at 937 (“For example, Section 1028 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act provides that, if certain conditions are met, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau ‘may prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement between a covered 
person and a consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing for arbitration of any future 
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CMS argued that the rule would be permitted under the enabling 
legislation’s “health” and “safety” mandates, the court rejected this 
interpretation as overly broad and supporting nearly any type of 
regulation.122 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did not weigh in on this 
important case, given the change in administrations.123 Although the district 
court suggested that the agency regulation should be analyzed directly 
against the FAA (as opposed to the enabling legislation), it considered 
whether the agency properly promulgated the regulation after considering 
the potential conflict with the FAA. This article suggests that those steps 
should occur in reverse, first considering the authority of the agency to 
promulgate the regulation and then comparing the regulation to the FAA. In 
2019, CMS rereleased regulations regarding pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in this area, and those new regulations are discussed below.124 
The creation of a “contrary regulatory command” rule would preserve 
the expertise of agencies and give more flexibility for regulating arbitration 
within limited spheres. This rule would still require agencies to act within 
their permissible authority under administrative law, but a “competing 
regulatory command” rule could give agencies significantly more power to 
regulate arbitration.  
 
B. Considerations for Assessing the Models 
 
This section considers numerous policy considerations to help 
determine the pros and cons of each proposal. The considerations are broken 
down into three categories: arbitration policies, legislative policies, and 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission to, “by rule,  prohibit, or impose conditions or limitations on the 
use of, agreements that require customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer 
to arbitrate any future dispute between them arising under the Federal securities laws”). 
122.  Id. at 937-38 (“This court thus recognizes the importance of the issues CMS raises, but they 
can only be regarded as ones involving resident ‘health, safety and welfare,’ under an exceedingly broad 
understanding of agency authority.”). 
123.  GGNSC Chestnut Hill LLC v. Schrader, No. CV 16-10525-DPW, 2018 WL 1582555, at *2 
(D. Mass, Mar. 31, 2018) (“While the government had appealed this decision to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the waning days of the Obama administration, see . . .  Am. Health 
Care Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 17-600005 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2017), the new administration published a 
proposed revised rule reversing the 2016 Rule banning nursing home arbitration, 82 Fed. Reg. 26649 
(June 8, 2017), 2017 WL 2462165, and coincidentally moved to dismiss its appeal of Judge Mills’s 
injunction.”). 
124.  See infra Section III.B 
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administrative policies. No one consideration is determinative, but this 
discussion hopes to give a robust examination of the competing proposals.  
  
1. Arbitration Policies 
 
Over time, the Supreme Court has articulated numerous policies 
regarding arbitration. The origins of the policy pronouncements are not 
always clearly articulated, and Congress did not include a list of “findings” 
or “purposes” in the FAA, as it does in some other legislation.125 In recent 
years, the Court articulated two policies impacting these proposals: the 
policy in favor of arbitration, and the policy favoring bilateral arbitration 
over class arbitration. 
 
a. Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration 
 
The Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury 
Construction Corp.126 famously stated that Congress declared a “liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state 
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”127 The Court has 
repeated this particular sentiment in a significant number of arbitration 
cases, notably in those involving preemption, conflicts of federal statutes, 
and arbitrability.128 The discussion of the evolution of Supreme Court 
 
125.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012) (“Congressional statement of findings and purpose” for the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12501 (2012) (stating findings and purposes for 
the Public Health Services Act).  
126.  460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
127.  Id. at 23 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2). Although the Moses H. Cone case is most often credited for 
making this pronouncement, it was not the first case to issue such a statement. The Court had previously 
made similar statements regarding labor arbitration. See, e.g., U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 
U.S. 351, 359 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing cases that “evince the fundamental role 
arbitration plays in implementing national labor relations policy”); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. 
Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964) (noting the “federal policy of settling labor disputes by 
arbitration”); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960); 
(same).  
128.  See, e.g., Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018) (citing the policy in a 
case involving a conflict of two statutes); Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 17 (2012) 
(unanimous decision of the Court in a case dealing with contract determination); Marmet Health Care 
Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533 (2012) (noting that the FAA demonstrates “emphatic federal 
policy in favor of” arbitration); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwod, 565 U.S. 97, 97-98 (2012) (involving 
a conflict of federal statutes); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 337-38 (2011) 
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precedent regarding reading the FAA consistently with other legislation is 
based, in part, on giving effect to Congress’s policy in favor of arbitration.129 
Although the policy in favor of arbitration is strong, its contours are 
amorphous. The Supreme Court invokes the policy in a number of different 
lines of arbitration case law,130 but the policy itself does not have clear 
application or specific requirements. Similarly, no criteria exist as to when 
the policy applies, but in practice, this policy has appeared in the vast 
majority of arbitration jurisprudence over the last decade. 
The federal policy in favor of arbitration would be preserved under the 
first model described above under in which a court would consider any 
“contrary congressional command” in the enabling legislation for the 
questioned regulation. Current arbitration law, culminating in CompuCredit 
and Epic Systems, demonstrates the lengths to which the Supreme Court will 
go to read federal statutes together to enforce pre-dispute agreements to 
arbitrate.131 The “contrary congressional command” rule would permit 
agencies to issue regulations prohibiting enforcement of pre-dispute 
agreements to arbitrate only if Congress specifically gives agencies 
authority to enact such regulations. In this way, the “contrary congressional 
command” rule is consistent with current arbitration jurisprudence.  
 
b. Policy Favoring Bilateral Arbitration 
 
The second arbitration policy that may apply to this inquiry is the policy 
in favor of bilateral arbitration, as opposed to class or collective 
arbitration.132 Although the history of class-action arbitration is outside of 
 
enacted the FAA to replace judicial indisposition to arbitration with a ‘national policy favoring [it] and 
plac[ing] arbitration agreements on equal footing.’”) (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 
546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)). 
129.  See supra Part I. In a recent essay, Professor Deacon questions why the FAA is treated 
differently than other statutes regarding conflicts of law. See Deacon, supra note 14, at 145 (“So why 
should the FAA be any different [than other conflicts of law questions]?”). The Supreme Court’s policy 
statements regarding the preference for arbitration present a significant legal hurdle to overcome that 
may not occur with other federal statutes.  
130.  See supra note 128.  
131.  Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1627 (concluding that the language regarding “concerted 
activity” was not inconsistent with the FAA’s right for parties to proceed in bilateral arbitration); 
CompuCredit, 565 U.S. at 103 (finding no conflict between a statute requiring a notice—which discusses 
a right of litigation—and the right to arbitrate under the same statute) 
132.  The difference between class arbitration and collective arbitration is that class arbitration 
proceeds with representatives representing the whole class, including absent class members, while 
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the scope of this article,133 the Court’s current position on arbitration is 
clear: without an express agreement for class arbitration, arbitration must 
proceed solely between the parties to the contract (i.e., bilateral 
arbitration).134 
The Court first articulated its resistance towards class arbitration 
proceedings in Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds, when it stated: “class-action 
arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot 
be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their 
disputes to an arbitrator.”135 The Court came to this conclusion, in part, 
because the “relative benefits of class-action arbitration are much less 
assured” than bilateral arbitration.136 In AT&T v. Concepcion, the Court 
expounded on the perceived differences between class arbitration and 
bilateral arbitration, focusing on reduced efficiencies, increased formality, 
questionable confidentiality, and higher-stakes proceedings for 
respondents.137 In Italian Colors, the Court continued to endorse bilateral 
arbitration over class-arbitration, even in the face of evidence that the cost 
of bilateral arbitration would far dwarf any potential recovery by individual 
claimants.138 The Court affirmed this policy in Epic Systems and other recent 
cases.139 
 
collective arbitration involves one proceeding with many claims consolidated into one action. See S.I. 
Strong, Mass Procedures as a Form of “Regulatory Arbitration”—Abaclat v. Argentine Republic and 
the International Investment Regime, 38 J. CORP. L. 259, 282-85 (2013) (discussing class and collective 
arbitration, as well as mass arbitration). 
133.  For a brief discussion of the history of class action arbitration, see BLANKLEY & WESTON, 
supra note 2, at 218-19 (proving an overview of cases first permitting, and then prohibiting, class action 
arbitration under a general arbitration clause). 
134.  Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1417 (2019) (stating that parties are “free to 
authorize” class arbitration proceedings, but a court will not imply such authority based on a “silent” 
arbitration clause); Epic Systems, 138 S.Ct. at 1627 (“And we've stressed that the absence of any specific 
statutory discussion of arbitration or class actions is an important and telling clue that Congress has not 
displaced the Arbitration Act.”).  
135.  Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010). 
136.  Id. at 686. The benefits of arbitration noted by the Court include cost efficiencies, time 
efficiencies, and the ability to choose “expert adjudicators.” Id.   
137.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 347-51 (2011) (discussing in detail the 
differences between bilateral and class arbitration). 
138.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (holding that the doctrine of 
“vindication of statutory rights” only includes the financial ability to enter the arbitration forum and not 
the additional costs of arbitration).  
139.  See Epic Systems, 138 S.Ct. at 1623 (“[C]ourts may not allow a contract defense to reshape 
traditional individualized arbitration by mandating classwide arbitration procedures without the parties' 
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The policy favoring bilateral arbitration does not directly impact the 
choice of rule between the “contrary congressional command” rule and the 
“contrary regulatory command” rule.140 Agencies, however, have watched 
these developments in arbitration law and some of the Obama-era 
arbitration regulations considered the issue of class actions.141 Under the 
“contrary congressional command” rule, agency rules prohibiting class 
action waivers without specific authority from Congress to issue regulations 
on the topic of arbitration, or perhaps class arbitration in particular, could 
not stand. The more agency-friendly “contrary regulatory command” rule 
would permit these types of regulations, despite the Supreme Court’s 
current statements on class arbitration. 
 
2. Legislative Policies 
 
The second category of considerations are those involving the reading 
of legislation, particularly in cases of conflicts between federal statutes. This 
second area considers canons for reading legislation together, as well as the 
doctrine of implied repeal.  
 
a. Reading Statutes Harmoniously 
 
At its core, the issues discussed in this Article involve how two federal 
authorities should be read together. When faced with two conflicting 
statues, federal courts first try to read the statutes together so neither is 
rendered nugatory.142 This canon of construction is a longstanding rule of 
 
arbitration); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S.Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (refusing to allow class arbitration 
under a general choice-of-law provision pointing to California law). 
140.  Supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
141.  The final rule of the CFPB would have permitted arbitration but prohibited the use of class 
action arbitration in financial products sold to consumers. That rule did not go into effect, after it was 
repealed by the Senate. Andrew Ackerman & Yuka Hayashi, Congress Makes it Harder to Sue the 
Financial Industry, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 24, 2017.) https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-votes-to-
overturn-cfpb-arbitration-rule-1508897968 [https://perma.cc/ZUR7-V2PE]. The Department of 
Education was successful in prohibiting pre-dispute arbitration agreements in contracts with Direct Loan 
Program borrowers and prohibited bans on class actions. 34 CFR § 865.300(e)-(f) (2018).  
142.  See, e.g., United States v. Ko, 739 F.3d 558, 561 (10th Cir. 2014) (reading criminal statutes 
together); United States v. Johnson, 66 F. App’x 320, 322 (3d Cir. 2003) (reading statutes together to 
determine proper sentence for defendant); Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Mem’l Hosp., 679. F.2d 1258, 
1262 (8th Cir. 1982) (“However, if possible, related statutes should be read together so that neither will 
be rendered nugatory.”); Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979) (reading together Freedom 








38            Washington University Journal of Law and Policy        [Vol. 63 
 
interpretation.143 The reasoning for this interpretation is self-explanatory. 
Congress should be presumed to pass statutes that complement each other 
and not render other statutes meaningless.  
In the area of arbitration, the Supreme Court has always tried to read 
statutes together so that effect can be given to both. In 2018, the Epic 
Systems Court relied on nearly four decades’ worth of precedent of reading 
statutes together to give effect to the substance of a statute while still 
permitting arbitration. The Court reminded us that, in nearly every case 
involving a question of whether a statutory right may be arbitrated, the 
Court held that the statutes could be read together such that the substantive 
right of the statute is preserved whether the parties resolve their disputes 
through litigation or arbitration.144 The “contrary congressional command” 
rule essentially creates a specialized canon of interpretation that appears to 
apply only in the arbitration context. The rule appears to combine two 
policies—the canon of interpretation that attempts to read statutes together, 
as well as the policy favoring arbitration. 
Applying the “contrary congressional command” rule to federal agency 
regulations would best preserve both sets of statutes, and would notably 
preserve arbitration in the face of regulations that would limit parties’ ability 
to enforce agreements to arbitrate. Allowing such regulations to stand would 
necessarily infringe on the general ability of parties to contract,145 and the 




of Information Act and Privacy Act); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 373 F.2d 136, 
142 (8th Cir. 1967) (“It is a familiar rule of statutory construction that statutes must be read together and 
that the legislative intent must be given effect if possible.”); United States v. Lehnherr, No. CR-07-0008-
S-BLW, 2007 WL 2071725, at *1 (D. Idaho July 13, 2007) (“The statutes must be read together and 
reconciled if possible under standard statutory interpretation principals [sic].”); Ohio-Sealy Mattress 
Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 429 F. Supp. 139, 141 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (reading together general venue statutes and 
venue designations in antitrust statutes); Sloand ex rel. Estate of Halby v. United States, 1950 A.M.C. 
1063, 1069 (W.D.N.Y. 1950) (“The pertinent statutes must be read together.”); In re Bowes, 160 B.R. 
290, 294 (Bnkr. N.D. Tex. 1993) (“The two statutes can be read together and the court can give effect 
to the legislative mandates in both statutes.”). 
143.  As the cases cited above demonstrate, this rule of interpretation has been invoked by every 
level of federal courts over a long period of time, in many different situations: from criminal law, to 
antitrust, to labor law, and many other types of situations. See supra note 142. 
144.  Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1627 (citations omitted). 
145.  9 U.S.C. §2 (making agreements to arbitrate enforceable save upon grounds that exist under 
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b. Presumption Against Implied Repeal 
 
A similar canon of construction preserving the integrity of two statutes 
is the presumption against implied repeal. Legislatures, of course, have the 
power to repeal past legislation.146 Such repeal may be express or implied.147 
If Congress did not expressly repeal an earlier statute, the court’s role is to 
read both statutes “so as to give effect to both, unless the text or legislative 
history of the later statute shows that Congress intended to repeal the earlier 
and simply failed to do so expressly.”148 Implied repeal has been “strongly 
disfavored”149 and occurs only when the two statutes are “irreconcilable.”150  
The presumption against implied repeal has a long history,151 and 
legislatures are presumed to act consistently.152 Courts will only find repeal 
if there exists a “repugnancy between them” or that “they cannot mutually 
coexist.”153 Recent Supreme Court precedent may have lessened the burden, 
 
146.  1A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION 448 (7th ed. 2009); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 327 (2012) (“The essence of the presumption against implied repeals 
is that if statutes are to be repealed, they should be repealed with some specificity.”). 
147.  SINGER §23:9, supra note 146, at 448-49. The courts may examine not only the act’s text 
but also the legislative history and other sources to determine if the legislature intended on repealing the 
earlier legislation.  Id. at 465-67. 
148.  United States v. Barrett, 837 F.2d 933, 934 (10th Cir. 1988). 
149.  Jesse W. Markham, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Implied Repeal Doctrine: Expanding 
Judicial Powers to Rewrite Legislation Under the Ballooning Conception of “Plain Repugnancy,” 45 
GONZ. L. REV. 437, 438 (2010). 
150.  United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb., 324 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974)) (“[I]n the absence of some affirmative showing of an 
intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and 
later statutes are irreconcilable.”); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 146, at 328 (noting that where 
“provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict 
constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one”). 
151.  Markham, supra note 149, at 439 (referring to the doctrine as one “of the oldest canons of 
statutory interpretation,” which “has been understood to be a very narrow doctrine that reconciles older 
and newer enactments by minimally paring back older law where there is no plausible understanding of 
the laws that can avoid the inconsistency.”).  
152.  SINGER §23:9, supra note 146, at 454. 
153.  Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976). 
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only requiring the statutes to be “clearly incompatible” rather than “plain[ly] 
repugnan[t],”154 but this rule may only apply in limited circumstances.155 
Because the FAA was enacted nearly one hundred years ago,156 one 
might expect that the doctrine of implied repeal would be commonly 
invoked in arbitration. To the contrary, the doctrine has only recently been 
argued, despite many decades passing since McMahon and Gilmer paved 
the way for the arbitration of statutory claims.157 When parties seeking to 
avoid arbitration raise the repeal argument, the courts reject this argument 
based on the presumption against repeal.158 Occasionally, the argument for 
implied repeal is successful, but usually in the context of varying procedural 
mechanisms, not the enforceability of an arbitration agreement.159 In Epic 
Systems, Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, was persuaded that the NLRA 
impliedly repealed the FAA in this instance because the NLRA was enacted 
“later in time.”160 Perhaps more litigants will begin to rule the waters of 
 
154.  Markham, supra note 146, at 443 (citing Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billings, 551 U.S. 
264, 275 (2007)). The Court also added a factor-based rule to help in its determination of implied repeal. 
Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 275-76.  
155.  The factor-based rule, on its face, only applies to cases involving antitrust and securities 
matters. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 275-76 (articulating four factors explicitly referencing antitrust and 
securities concerns). 
156.  See Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925). Although the FAA 
was originally enacted in 1925, Congress re-enacted in in 1947. Notably, Section 2, regarding the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements, remained unchanged in the 1925 and 1947 versions of the FAA. 
See Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Stat. 669 (1947). 
157.  Supra Subsection I.B.1. 
158.  Implied repeal became a common argument for workers seeking to avoid individual 
arbitration. The workers claimed that the NLRA’s “concerted activity” language impliedly repealed the 
FAA. See NLRB v. Alt. Entm’t, Inc., 858 F.3d 393, 417 (6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (rejecting implied repeal); Lewis v. Epic Sys., 823 F.3d 1147, 1157 (7th Cir. 
2016) (rejecting implied repeal); Delock v. Securitas Sec. Serv. USA, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 784, 790-91 
(E.D. Ark. 2012) (rejecting implied repeal in a class action case). Other types of implied repeal have 
also been difficult for proponents to secure. See, e.g., Logan & Kanawha Coal Co., LLC v. Detherage 
Coal Sales, LLC, 789 F. Supp. 2d 716, 721-22 (S.D.W.V. 2011) (rejecting argument that implied repeal 
required service by U.S. Marshal to confirm an arbitration award).   
159.  See, e.g., Smallwood v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 660 F.3d 1115, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(impliedly repealing small amount of FAA in a conflict with the Carmack Amendment, based on the 
FAA’s and Carmack’s most recent reenactments); Dist. No. 8 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists AFL-CIO v. 
Grindmaster Cathco Sys., Inc., No. 02-C-4346, 2002 WL 31115588, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2002) 
(finding implied repeal applied by the Labor-Management Relations Act of the FAA regarding the 
enforcement of an arbitration award in the context of a union claim).  
160.  Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1646 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Note 
that Justice Ginsburg did not argue that the FAA should be repealed entirely and in all situations. The 
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implied repeal now that it was cited, albeit in dissent, by a Supreme Court 
justice. 
The presumption against implied repeal supports the “contrary 
congressional command” rule, and not the “contrary regulatory command 
rule.” The “contrary congressional command” rule attempts to read together 
two sets of legislation to give them both effect, if possible—which is the 
same goal as the presumption against implied repeal. The “contrary 
regulatory command” rule, however, would allow regulations to displace 
the enforceability of arbitration agreements under the FAA, even if the 
enabling legislation was not as clear.161 
 
3. Administrative Policies 
 
A final set of considerations stems from administrative law. While the 
legislative policies predictably support a “contrary congressional 
command” rule, the administrative policies do not necessarily support the 
“contrary regulatory command” rule. This subsection considers implied 
repeal by regulation, deference due to agency action under Chevron, 
agencies acting under their authority, and separation of powers concerns. 
 
a. Implied Repeal by Regulation 
 
Under certain circumstances, implied repeal can involve regulations, 
because they have the force and effect of law.162 As with the general doctrine 
of implied repeal by statute, a strong presumption exists against giving 
agency rules and actions the power to repeal statutes passed earlier in 
time.163 Courts are most likely to find a statute impliedly repealed by agency 
 
161.  See supra Subsection II.A.2. 
162.  See Mogis v. Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Corp., 189 F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1951); Indus. Life 
Ins. Co. v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 870, 875 (D.S.C. 1972) (“Treasury Regulations have the force 
and effect of law”). 
163.  SINGER §23:9, supra note 146, at 471 (“When there is a conflict between a statutory 
provision and a later provision which is included in a rule promulgated under special rule-making power, 
the statutory provision generally remains in effect.”). In some cases, the Supreme Court chooses to frame 
a case as a conflict between statutes, as opposed to a conflict between an agency action and a statute. 
See Nhan T. Vu & Jeff Schwartz, Workplace Rights and Illegal Immigration: How Implied Repeal 
Analysis Cuts Through the Haze of Hoffman Plastic, Its Predecessors and Its Progeny, 29 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 16 (2008) (“Despite the fact that the case could have been viewed as one involving 
the conflict between the Board’s findings and the Bankruptcy Code, the majority, dissent, and 
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action when the enabling legislation specifically gives the agency the power 
to repeal earlier legislation.164 The general principles of implied repeal by 
agency follow the same two steps outlined above under the “contrary 
congressional command” rule articulated for arbitration cases. 
An example of a court using this framework can be found in a conflict 
between the FAA and a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) construction of 
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA). The FTC “found that written 
warranties cannot require binding arbitration,”165 creating a conflict with the 
FAA.166 In the early 2000s, some courts considered the issue by using a 
framework of potential conflict between the FAA and the MMWA, 
followed by an examination of the MMWA and the FTC ruling. 
For example, in 2002, the Fifth Circuit examined the FAA and the 
MMWA to determine if the MMWA contained a contrary congressional 
command to override the Arbitration Act.167 After citing McMahon, the 
court concluded that the “MMWA does not specifically address binding 
arbitration, nor does it specifically allow the FTC to decide whether to 
permit or to ban binding arbitration.”168 The MMWA, however, allowed the 
FTC to establish rules to create “informal dispute [resolution] procedures” 
for disputants to use prior to going to court.169 The court reasoned that 
because arbitration is a substitute for court and not a prerequisite to court, 
the FTC did not, in fact, have the power to ban enforcement of pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements.170 The court also held that arbitration was not an 
“informal” process as that term was used in the statute and discussed in the 
 
subsequent commentators all understood the case to be about a potential conflict between the NLRA 
and the Bankruptcy Code.”). Arguably, the Epic Systems Court engaged in a similar analysis, comparing 
the two statutes, rather than considering the conflict between the statute and the applicable agency 
regulation. 
164.  See, e.g., United States v. Lahey Clinic Hosp. Inc., 399 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Congress 
could, perhaps (we need not decide), attempt to expressly provide for repeal of a statute or displacement 
of the common law through delegation of such power to an agency.”); see also SINGER & SINGER, supra 
note 146, at 520 (discussing the ability for a legislature to give an agency the ability to repeal prior 
statutory law in the enabling legislation). 
165.  Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes, LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 475 (5th Cir. 2002). 
166.  This regulation conflicts with 9 U.S.C. § 2, which requires that agreements to arbitrate be 
enforced in accordance with their terms. 
167.  Rose Mobile Homes, 298 F.3d at 473-76 (examining the applicable legislation and 
regulations). 
168.  Id. at 475. 
169.  Id. 
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MMWA’s legislative history.171 Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit enforced the 
agreement to arbitrate.172 The dissent, however, determined that the 
MMWA’s silence on the issue of arbitration was sufficient to move to a 
robust discussion of Chevron deference.173 A more detailed analysis on the 
conflict between the FAA and MMWA is discussed below.174 The Walton 
case is discussed here as an example of a case considering whether an 
agency rule could repeal a previously enacted statute. 
To the extent that the presumption against implied repeal is even 
stronger in cases involving regulatory action, this policy favors using the 
“contrary congressional command” approach, as opposed to a “contrary 
regulatory command” approach. Also, because this doctrine specifically 
involves a consideration of the enabling legislation and an examination as 
to whether Congress intended the agency to have the power to impliedly 
repeal other law, this further supports a “contrary congressional command” 
rule.  
 
b. Chevron Deference 
 
Courts afford agencies deference to interpret their own enabling 
legislation.175 Under the Chevron analysis, a court must make the following 
determinations prior to deferring to the agency: 
First, always, is the question [of] whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent 
of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, 
 
171.  Id. at 476-78 (examining text and legislative history and comparing the text and legislative 
history of the MMWA to other statutes that the Supreme Court had already examined, such as the 
ADEA). 
172.  Id.  
173.  Id. at 483-85 (discussing the statutes at issue, as well as commentating that the MMWA’s 
silence on this exact issue gives the FTC flexibility on the question of “informal” dispute resolution). 
For additional commentary on the Rose Mobile Homes case as one involving the reluctance of an agency 
rule to repeal a previously enacted statute, see Case Note, Arbitration—Fifth Circuit Holds Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act Claims Arbitral Despite Agency Interpretation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1201 (2003). 
174.  See infra Section III.B. 
175.  See, e.g., Caitlin Miller, The Balancing Act Between Chevron Deference and the Rule of 
Lenity, 18 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 193, 194 (2017) (“When a case involves an ambiguous agency 
statute, courts can look to the agency’s interpretation of that statute and decide whether to use the 
interpretation.”). 
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the court determines Congress has not directly addressed 
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply 
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be 
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. 
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to 
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.176 
The deference owed to agency interpretations is, of course, not limitless. 
Agency interpretations that are “arbitrary” or “against the intent of the 
statute” must still be rejected.177 If an agency has authority to interpret the 
statue, though, Chevron deference is generous.178 More recent 
developments in Chevron deference first ask if the agency determination 
has the “force of law,” such as by utilizing notice-and-comment procedures, 
before applying deference.179 Agency actions that do not have the “force of 
law” may still be provided deference under the older Skidmore v. Swift 
standard.180 The King v. Burwell181 Court questioned the appropriateness of 
deference in questions of “deep economic and political significance.”182 
Although the question of the appropriate level of deference appears to be in 
 
176.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); see also 
Rachel E. Holland, Setting the Caged Bird Free: Restoring Judicial Power to Meaningfully Review 
Administrative Interpretations of the Law, 49 TEX. TECH. L. REV., 927, 936 (2017) (“As long as an 
agency's statutory interpretation is reasonable, it is entitled to deference under Chevron.”). 
177.  Miller, supra note 175, at 198-200 (discussing how a court will only consider the agency’s 
interpretation of a statute if Congress has not explicitly determined the meaning on its own). 
178.  Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An Empirical Study of the 
Supreme Court’s Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REV. 289, 
298 (2002) (“Once a court reads a gap in a statute to constitute an implied delegation of decisionmaking 
authority by Congress to an agency, the court will rarely, if ever, reject the agency's decision as 
impermissible or arbitrary and capricious.”). 
179.  Id. at 309-11 (discussing the changes to administrative law based on United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)). 
180.  Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) (differentiating between a rule arrived at after notice-and-comment procedures 
and opinion letters); Holland, supra note 176, at 936-37 (discussing post-Chevron developments limiting 
deference). Determining whether the agency action has “force of law” often referred to as “step zero.” 
See Paul Chaffin, Expertise and Immigration Administration: When Does Chevron Apply to BIA 
Interpretations of the INA?, 69 N.Y. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 503, 567-68 (2013) (discussing use of Chevron 
step zero in the immigration context). 
181.  135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
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flux, the principle of giving agencies deference is still highly recognized, 
albeit perhaps in different degrees. 
The underlying policy reasons for deference include giving effect to the 
legislature’s intent and recognizing agency expertise. For some 
commentators, recent Supreme Court decisions focus on the legislature’s 
delegation of authority to the administrative body more than any other 
underlying value.183 This policy interpretation is rooted in statutory analysis 
and deference to the legislature, the delegating body, more than deference 
to the agency.184 
Earlier Supreme Court authority emphasized deference in the context of 
the agency’s “specialized experience” or expertise.185 Agency 
interpretations of their own rules are also subject to deference, because, 
having written the regulation, the agency presumably is in the best place to 
know what it intended.186 Agencies are, by their nature, experts in their 
area—be it the environment, labor, education, health, telecommunications, 
energy, or any other area singled out for regulation. Agencies employ 
experts and also become experts as they engage in education, research, 
policy, outreach, and other types of activities. Agencies are also more 
flexible and sufficiently nimble to create the details that are necessary for a 
comprehensive system, particularly when the alternative would be creation 
through a legislative body.187 
These policies relating to deference to agencies could support either the 
“contrary congressional command” rule or the “contrary regulatory 
 
183.  See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, 
and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. J. 735, 746-47 (2002) (“[I]n Mead the Supreme 
Court squarely located the requirement of Chevron deference on a theory of an implied delegation of 
lawmaking power.). 
184.  See id. at 747 (noting that deference is tied to Congress’s power in determining the scope of 
the agency’s power). 
185.  Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139; see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 311 (2013) 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (noting the helpfulness of the “agency’s expertise” in resolving the issue); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV 2071, 2116 (1990) (discussing 
agency expertise as a reason for deference). 
186.  Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S.Ct. 2400, 2407 (2019) (discussing Auer deference for agencies 
interpreting their own ambiguous rules). Under Auer v. Robbins, agencies are owed deference in 
interpreting ambiguous rules. 519 U.S. 452, 463 (1997) (“A rule requiring the Secretary to construe his 
own regulations narrowly would make little sense, since he is free to write the regulations as broadly as 
he wishes, subject only to the limits imposed by the statute.”). 
187.  Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. 
L. REV. 2009, 2042 (2011) (“Congress is likely to delegate authority to agencies to avoid complex issues 
and capitalize on agency expertise.”). 
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command” rule for analyzing agency regulations in light of the FAA. If the 
purpose of deference is respect for the legislature and the legislature’s intent 
for the agency, the “contrary congressional command” rule would more 
closely fit with that policy. Under this rule, enabling legislation that is silent 
on the issue of arbitration would preclude the agency from creating 
regulations that would bar enforcement of arbitration agreements, even 
within its area of expertise. If the purpose of deference is agency expertise, 
then the “contrary regulatory command” rule is the better option. Good 
policy reasons exist for allowing agencies to dictate the parameters of 
arbitration within their particular areas of expertise, even if their enabling 
legislation is ambiguous or silent on this point. 
Professor Deacon argues that agencies should have more authority to 
regulate arbitration because of Chevron deference and agency expertise.188 
He argues that “agencies should have authority to reasonably interpret their 
statutes to regulate arbitration” and that the FAA should operate in the 
“background,” as a default.189 Chevron deference applies when Congress 
has not spoken directly on a question,190 allowing the agencies to fill in the 
gaps and make practical choices.191 Professor Deacon’s reasoning illustrates 
the catch-22 in favor of arbitration under the “contrary congressional 
command rule.” Chevron deference applies when enabling legislation is 
ambiguous or silent on an issue, and yet the “contrary congressional 
command rule” would nearly always interpret ambiguity or silence in favor 
of the FAA, thus leaving almost no room for Chevron deference in matters 




188.  Deacon, supra note 14, at 1034 (“In many cases [courts] have not seriously engaged with 
the interaction of Chevron and the FAA, instead reading the Supreme Court’s recent arbitration opinions 
broadly as expressing extreme reluctance to set aside arbitration agreements on any grounds.”). 
189.  Id. at 1035 (“But within their regulatory domains, agencies have the authority to depart from 
background law in order to regulate more stringently (within the reasonable bounds set by their 
statutes.)”). 
190.  Id. at 1036-37 (“In other words, if a court determines that Congress has not spoken directly 
to the question at issue and there is thus an ambiguity, the court must defer to the agency’s reasonable 
resolution of that ambiguity even if the court would have chosen a different interpretation on its own.”).  
191.  Id. at 1039-40 (“[W]hen Congress writes a flexible statute and delegates authority over that 
statute to an administrative agency, it is . . . delegate[ing] lawmaking authority to an agency is a decision 
to allow the agency to disrupt existing legal relationships [such as dispute resolution] (within the bounds 
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c. Agencies Acting Within Their Statutory Authority 
 
Another consideration to consider is the general requirement that an 
agency only act within the scope of its authority.192 The delegation of 
authority to agencies is unique and based on the statute establishing each 
agency.193 The legislature can delegate to agencies not only rulemaking 
powers but also other authority, such as adjudicatory and enforcement 
authority.194 The purpose of agencies is to implement “specific policy 
details from statutory guidance.”195 The Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) also requires agencies to act within the grant of power made by the 
legislature.196 As a general manner, when Congress grants broad regulatory 
authority to an agency, it also delegates interpretive authority.197 Agencies 
cannot act outside of their jurisdiction, and such actions may be invalidated 
by courts.198  
This consideration should apply equally under both the “contrary 
congressional command” rule and the “contrary regulatory command” rule. 
This administrative law principle controls under either rule because the 
agency must have authority to regulate, no matter when that regulation is 
compared to the FAA. To date, few statutes have specifically given 
 
192.  Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: 
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 
387, 401 (“[A]n agency is constitutionally empowered to act only under the authority delegated to it by 
the legislature.”). 
193.  William Weaver, Note, Multiple-Agency Delegations & One-Agency Chevron, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 275, 279 (2014) (“Each delegation specifies the various institutional designs and mechanisms 
through which Congress can check agency action in each unique context. Sometimes Congress delegates 
broadly. Sometimes Congress cabins agency authority.”).  
194.  Id. at 283 (“Sometimes, Congress plainly and explicitly delegates rulemaking authority to 
administrative agencies. Other times, Congress delegates authority to agencies, but not rulemaking 
authority.”) 
195.  Id. at 285; Bressman, supra note 187, at 2033-34 (discussing empirical research regarding 
congressional intent post-Chevron to give agencies authority to interpret ambiguities in legislation). 
196.  5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2012); see also Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-
Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 994-95 (1999) (discussing scope of agency authority 
under the APA). 
197.  Bressman, supra note 175, at 2037-38 (discussing the literature on the question of whether 
Congress intends to bestow interpretive power within an agency when it gives the agency broad 
regulatory power); Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 196, at 995 (“While agencies often interpret their 
regulatory authority expansively, such assertions generally are limited to situations where the agency 
clearly has jurisdiction over the practices involved.”). 
198.  Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 196, at 996-1004 (giving detailed analysis on instances in 
which agencies have overstepped their boundaries). 
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authority to agencies regarding arbitration. Given the silence on the issue, 
agencies have grappled with the questions of whether they have the 
authority to regulate arbitration as it relates to their more explicit authority. 
For example, the Department of Education recently issued regulations 
prohibiting banks offering direct loans from including arbitration 
agreements in their loan agreements.199 Congress gave the Secretary of 
Education broad authority to develop and administer the Direct Loan 
Program,200 but did not mention arbitration in the text of the statute. 
Although the Department of Education is not an expert on arbitration, it is 
an expert on educational loans. Given that lenders who participate in the 
program include arbitration agreements in their contracts with students, 
should the Department have the ability to regulate their use of arbitration 
for federal loans? This question is explored in more detail below.201   
 
d. Separation-of-Powers Concerns 
 
Finally, this subsection considers separation-of-powers concerns for 
agencies. Generally, agencies are considered part of the executive branch 
because they are tasked with the enforcement and administration of laws.202 
Congress, of course, creates the agencies and tasks them with a charge—
both of which should include an “intelligible principle” to cabin their 
powers.203 If an agency issues a regulation that conflicts with a federal 
statute, a separation-of-powers issue may arise from an executive branch 
entity attempting to nullify or otherwise change a congressional act. If such 
a separation-of-powers conflict occurs, the “contrary congressional 
 
199.  81 Fed. Reg. 75,926 (Nov. 1, 2016).  
200.  20 U.S.C. § 1087b (2019) (“Funds for origination of direct student loans”). 
201.  See infra Section III.B. This section started by laying out the two potential rules for 
determining whether a contrary command to the FAA should be controlling. In the discussion of the 
“contrary regulatory command,” this article discussed the AHCA v. Burwell case involving the Medicare 
and Medicaid nursing home regulations prohibiting arbitration. The court engaged in a discussion about 
whether the agency had the proper authority under its own enabling legislation to issue the regulations 
at issue. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text. 
202.  Holland, supra note 165, at 927-32 (“Because they often assist with the enforcement of laws, 
administrative agencies are traditionally considered part of the Executive Branch.”). 
203.  See Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 184, at 989-90 (discussing how Congress limits the 
powers of delegation through its grant of authority in the first instance); see also id. at 991 (“Consistent 










2020]       Framework for Federal Agency Rules Impacting Arbitration        49 
 
 
command” approach would be the better model for ensuring that the action 
of one branch does not encroach on the other.  
The AHCA v. Burwell204 case involving the nursing home regulations 
addressed separation-of-powers concerns. The government contended that 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services had the power to ban pre-
dispute arbitration agreements under the statutory language allowing the 
Secretary to impose “such other requirements relating to the health and 
safety” of nursing home residents.205 The court rejected this argument, 
noting that the “language is broad, but also quite vague.”206 Despite being 
sympathetic to the government’s substantive position, the court nonetheless 
expressed concern that if “health and safety” concerns included arbitration, 
then “other agencies would choose to broadly exert power in a variety of 
contexts.”207 Such a broad reading of authority would constitute a 
separation-of-powers concern between the executive branch and the 
legislative branch,208 particularly in situations in which Congress 
considered, but did not have enough votes to pass, legislation similar to the 
rules promulgated by the agency.209 AHCA demonstrates how separation-
of-powers concerns might arise when an agency broadly interprets its 
powers broadly to regulate arbitration when arbitration is not central to the 
statutory mandate for the agency.  
 
4. Weighing Policy Concerns 
 
Nearly all the factors above weigh in favor of applying the “contrary 
congressional command” rule to agency actions or regulations dealing with 
arbitration. As characterized above, the “FAA” and “legislative” policies 
strongly support a rule that will preserve as much of two potentially 
inconsistent statutes as possible. Even the administrative law policies, such 
as agencies staying within their authority and not violating separation-of-
 
204.  Am. Health Care Assocs. v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d 921 (N.D. Miss. 2016). 
205.  Id. at 934.  
206.  Id. 
207.  Id. at 934-35. 
208.  Id. at 935.  
209.  Id. at 936; see also id. at 944 (“This court frankly believes that these issues are even more 
important than the arbitration issues, and the potential that the Rule might serve to violate the basic 
separation of powers principles in the U.S. Constitution seems a quite relevant factor in deciding whether 
to allow the federal courts to resolve any concerns in this regard before allowing it to go into effect.”). 
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powers concerns, weigh in favor of the “contrary congressional command” 
rule. On balance, the far greater weight of policy appears to favor finding a 
way to first read the statutes together, followed by considering whether the 
agency action is proper.  
In application, this rule would largely prohibit agencies with enabling 
legislation silent on the issue of arbitration from promulgating rules or 
otherwise taking action to invalidate pre-dispute arbitration agreements, 
whether such action is regulatory, such as in the Medicare/Medicaid 
context, or adjudicatory, such as decisions made by the NLRB. This 
outcome aligns with Supreme Court precedent, including Gilmer210 and, 
more recently, Epic Systems.211 
The biggest downside of the “contrary congressional command” rule is 
the loss of agency expertise in a particular area as it relates to arbitration. 
The Department of Health and Human Services may have expertise in the 
area of nursing homes, making them uniquely qualified to issue regulations 
regarding the proper language that should be in nursing home contracts, 
including arbitration clauses. Similar arguments may be made for the 
Department of Labor, the Department of Education, and other agencies. 
Expertise, however, cannot be enough, as administrative law requires that 
agencies act within their areas of delegation. On the whole, the balance of 
policies and law weighs in favor of the “contrary congressional command” 
rule.  
 
III. CASE STUDIES DEMONSTRATING DIFFERENCES  
BETWEEN THE MODELS 
 
Having considered the existing laws and relevant policies, this part 
provides concrete examples of how the “contrary congressional command” 
and “contrary regulatory command” rules would operate in practice. This 
part begins with the “easy” case of the authority granted to the CFPB 
regarding arbitration, but then discusses more complex problems regarding 
interpretation of arbitration regulations and actions in the contexts of the 
MMWA, the Direct Loan Program, and the newest iterations of regulations 
 
210.  See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text. 
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dealing with arbitration in contracts with long term care facilities under 
Medicare and Medicaid.  
 
A. An Easy Case—Regulations by the CFPB  
Following the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act created the CFPB, including specific statutory 
language regarding the agency’s ability to regulate arbitration. In 
accordance with the legislation, the CFPB promulgated amendments to 
Truth in Lending Act regulations, notably Regulation Z. The CFPB rule 
specifies: 
(h) Prohibition on mandatory arbitration clauses and 
waivers of certain consumer rights— 
(1) Arbitration. A contract or other agreement for a 
consumer credit transaction secured by a dwelling 
(including a home equity line of credit secured by the 
consumer's principal dwelling) may not include terms that 
require arbitration or any other non-judicial procedure to 
resolve any controversy or settle any claims arising out of 
the transaction. This prohibition does not limit a consumer 
and creditor or any assignee from agreeing, after a dispute 
or claim under the transaction arises, to settle or use 
arbitration or other non-judicial procedure to resolve that 
dispute or claim.212 
Although this regulation clearly prohibits enforcement of certain 
arbitration agreements, it closely tracks language directly from the Dodd-
Frank Act: 
(e) Arbitration 
(1) In general 
No residential mortgage loan and no extension of credit 
under an open end consumer credit plan secured by the 
principal dwelling of the consumer may include terms 
which require arbitration or any other nonjudicial 
procedure as the method for resolving any controversy or 
settling any claims arising out of the transaction. 
 
212.  12 C.F.R. §1026.36(h) (2013) (emphasis added). 
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(2) Post-controversy agreements 
Subject to paragraph (3), paragraph (1) shall not be 
construed as limiting the right of the consumer and the 
creditor or any assignee to agree to arbitration or any other 
nonjudicial procedure as the method for resolving any 
controversy at any time after a dispute or claim under the 
transaction arises.213 
The CFPB received specific authority from Congress to implement the 
federal “consumer financial laws through rules, orders, guidance, 
interpretations, statements of policy, examinations, and enforcement 
actions.”214 Employing either the “contrary congressional command” rule 
or the “contrary regulatory command” rule, this particular regulation should 
stand as written, successfully prohibiting pre-dispute arbitration clauses in 
this particular context. 
Under the “contrary congressional command” rule, a court would first 
consider whether the Dodd-Frank Act functions as a contrary congressional 
command. In this case, the Dodd-Frank Act contains clear language that 
would negate the “federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”215 After 
having concluded that the Dodd-Frank Act permits the agency to abrogate 
arbitration rights, the second step is to ensure that the CFPB properly 
promulgated its own rule. In this case, the CFPB has specific authority to 
implement consumer financial rules, and this particular rule closely follows 
the language of the Act.216 Nothing suggests that the CFPB went outside of 
its authority, so this regulation should stand despite its limitations on the 
ability of    parties to enter into arbitration agreements.  
In addition, Congress authorized the CFPB to “conduct a study” of the 
use of arbitration in the context of consumer financial products.217 Congress 
further gave the CFBP the authority to “prohibit or impose conditions or 
limitations on the use of an agreement between a covered person and a 
consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing for 
arbitration of any future dispute between the parties” if such regulations are 
“in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.”218 In response 
 
213.  15 U.S.C. §1639(c)-(e) (2018) (emphasis added). 
214.  12 U.S.C. §5492 (2010). 
215.  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
216.  This article assumes that the CFPB followed all proper procedures.  
217.  12 U.S.C. § 5518(a) (2010).  
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to this authority, the CFBP conducted a study of arbitration and provided its 
728-page report to Congress in 2015.219 As noted above, following the 
issuance of the report, the CFPB promulgated rules that would have forbade 
financial institutions from including class action waivers in their dispute 
resolution clauses.220 The rule was overturned in a dramatic Senate vote of 
fifty-one to fifty under the Congressional Review Act.221 Had that rule gone 
into effect, the analysis of determining its enforceability would be identical 
to the regulation prohibiting the inclusion of pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in the mortgage context. 
 
B. Harder Cases 
 
The example of the CFPB shows analytically how this analysis can 
reach the same result with two different analytical frameworks. This section 
considers three cases that are much harder—issues arising under the 
MMWA, the Department of Education regulations prohibiting arbitration 
agreements in the Direct Loan Program, and the re-promulgated rules for 
long-term care facilities. The MMWA issue is not new, and despite early 
case law from the early 2000s, the issue remains unresolved. This discussion 
is included because of its longevity and the varying approaches taken 
throughout the country. The Direct Loan and long-term care facility 
regulations are new and have not generated case law yet. That discussion 




Despite somewhat “unclear authority” to do so under the MMWA, the 
FTC has regulated arbitration issues in the past.222 This subsection considers 
the statutory authority and regulations at issue and analyzes the regulations 
under the “contrary congressional command” rule and the “contrary 
regulatory command” rule. This subsection also considers the opinions of 
 
219.  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY (2015), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N386-6LQQ]. The CFPB also issued a preliminary report in 2013. This earlier report 
is replicated in the 2015 report. Id. 
220.  See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
221.  Id. 
222.  Deacon, supra note 14, at 1020. 
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the federal courts that have ruled on this issue, focusing on the process used 
to analyze the regulations.  
The MMWA legislation on dispute resolution begins by encouraging 
“informal dispute [resolution] mechanisms” between consumers and 
warrantors.223 Despite this encouragement, Congress tasked the FTC with 
“setting forth minimum requirements for any such informal dispute 
[resolution]” incorporated into a warranty covered by the Act.224 Warrantors 
seeking to take advantage of such dispute resolution must establish a 
procedure consistent with the rules that are incorporated into the language 
of the warranty itself.225 If those requirements are met, the consumer may 
not “commence a civil action (other than a class action)” under the MMWA 
unless the consumer “initially resorts to such procedure.”226  
Following enactment of the MMWA, the FTC issued rules prohibiting 
the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer warranty 
contracts.227 The FTC reaffirmed these provisions in several more recent 
rulemakings,228 the most recent in 2015. Although the applicable regulation 
does not use the word “arbitration,” the regulations state: “Decisions of the 
[Dispute Resolution] Mechanism shall not be legally binding on any 
person.”229 The regulations contemplate a hearing before a neutral decision-
maker, but the result of the hearing must be advisory, as opposed to “legally 
binding.”230 
From an analytical standpoint, whether the FTC regulation prohibiting 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements is enforceable depends on whether a 
court would apply the “contrary congressional command” rule or the 
 
223.  15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (2018) (“Congress hereby declares it to be its policy to encourage 
warrantors to establish procedures whereby consumer disputes are fairly and expeditiously settled 
through informal dispute settlement mechanisms.”). 
224.  15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2) (2018) (“The Commission shall prescribe rules setting forth 
minimum requirements for any informal dispute settlement procedure which is incorporated into the 
terms of a written warranty to which any provision of this chapter applies. Such rules shall provide for 
participation in such procedure by independent or governmental entities.”); see also Deacon, supra note 
14, at 1020 (describing MMWA requirements). 
225.  15 U.S.C. §§ 2310(a)(3)(A)-(C) (2018).  
226.  Id. The MMWA further gave the FTC the ability to investigate a warrantor’s informal 
dispute resolution process upon a request by a consumer to do so or on its own initiative to determine 
whether the procedure is in accordance with the law. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(4) (2018). 
227.  Deacon, supra note 14, at 1020 (“Shortly after Congress passed the Magnusson-Moss Act, 
the FTC invoked its powers to prohibit binding arbitration provisions in warranty contracts.”). 
228.  Id.  
229.  16 C.F.R. § 703.5(j) (2015).  
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“contrary regulatory demand” rule. If a court were to apply the “contrary 
congressional command” rule, the regulation would be unenforceable. 
Nothing in the MMWA explicitly mentions arbitration, much less 
specifically bans enforcement of arbitration agreements. When Congress 
tasked the FTC with creating regulations for dispute resolution, Congress 
did not give the FTC any specific powers relating to arbitration. Nor does 
the legislative history suggest that Congress intended to ban enforcement of 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements. A minority of legislators spoke 
positively of “binding arbitration,” in the House report,231 but the Senate 
report noted an intent that consumer grievances be resolved “without the aid 
of litigation or formal arbitration.”232 Without any specific language 
banning pre-dispute arbitration in either the text or the legislative history, 
the CompuCredit Court233 would support reading the FAA and the MMWA 
together, allowing enforcement of binding, pre-dispute arbitration. The 
CompuCredit Court considered a statute that contained some discussion 
about a method of dispute resolution, and whether the discussion of one 
method of dispute resolution precluded the use of arbitration.234 Under the 
“contrary congressional command” rule, arbitration would be permitted, 
and the FTC’s rule would be deemed unenforceable. 
If a court employed the “contrary regulatory command” rule, the FTC’s 
rule would likely stand. Under this analysis, the first questions would be 
whether the FTC had the authority to promulgate the anti-arbitration rule 
under administrative law principles. A strong argument exists that the 
FTC’s ruling was proper and within the proper scope of its authority. 
Congress gave the FTC the authority to create informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms and designate the requirements for such a program.235 Under 
this legislative charge, the FTC determined that the informal dispute 
resolution could not be “binding.”236 Whether dispute resolution is binding 
is a natural discussion in dispute system design,237 and the FTC would have 
 
231.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 83 (1974) (discussing binding arbitration as an alternative to class 
actions). 
232.  S. REP. NO. 91-876, at 22-23 (1970) (emphasis added). 
233.  CompuCredit Corp v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012). 
234.  Id. at 99-100 (noting that the discussion of the “right to sue” in the required disclosures does 
not prohibit a bank from including a binding arbitration agreement in its consumer contracts). 
235.  15 U.S.C. § 2310(a) (2018). 
236.  16 C.F.R. § 703.5(j). 
237.  See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let’s Find Out: A Public Policy Research 
Program on Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 101, 107-08 (arguing that whether a dispute 
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the flexibility to make this determination under the MMWA. Indeed, the 
MMWA discusses “informal” dispute resolution, and the FTC could have 
determined that binding arbitration was not informal.238 Provided the FTC 
has the authority under the MMWA to prohibit binding arbitration, the 
regulation would stand as a “contrary regulatory authority” to the FAA. 
Courts’ rulings on this very question have produced mixed results. 
Some courts are applying a version of the “contrary congressional 
command” rule. For example, in Davis v. Southern Energy Homes, the 
Eleventh Circuit framed the inquiry as “whether the Magnuson–Moss 
Warranty Act permits or precludes enforcement of binding arbitration 
agreements with respect to written warranty claims,”239 and both parties 
framed their arguments to the court assuming that the court would first 
consider the conflict between the FAA and the MMWA.240 In examining the 
MMWA, the Eleventh Circuit, relying on Gilmer, Rodriguez, and 
McMahon, considered the question in the context of a contrary 
congressional command.241 The court found nothing in the text to prohibit 
arbitration and determined that the legislative history was “ambiguous at 
most.”242 Although the Eleventh Circuit found no conflict between the FAA 
and the MMWA, it also considered the FTC’s authority to promulgate its 
rule regarding binding dispute resolution under Chevron.243 The court 
determined that the FTC was “unreasonable” in prohibiting binding 
 
resolution process is “binding” is a critical factor in categorizing systems); Lisa B. Bingham, Self-
Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873, 886 
(2002) (same). Dispute system design considers how courts, organizations, communities, and others can 
create the best process for resolving a particular dispute or type of dispute. See generally Andrea Kupfer 
Schneider, How Does DSD Help Us Teach About Community Conflict (And How Can Community 
Conflict Help Illustrate DSD)?, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 370, 371-73 (2017).    
238.  Whether binding arbitration is “formal” or “informal” can be debated among scholars and 
practitioners, and the assessment usually hinges on the perceived alternative. Compared to court, 
arbitration is informal. Compared to mediation and negotiation, arbitration’s rules and procedures make 
the process significantly more formal. For one analysis, Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic 
Framework for Dispute System Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 127 (2009) (considering 
arbitration a formal process because a third party has the “power to render a binding decision”). 
239.  305 F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2002). The Davis case involved a warranty issue in the sale 
of a mobile home, and the contract with the warrantor contained a binding pre-dispute arbitration clause. 
Id. at 1270. 
240.  Id. at 1271 (both parties made arguments regarding the text, legislative history, and 
underlying purposes of the MMWA). 
241.  Id. at 1273-74 (applying the McMahon test).  
242.  Id. at 1275-76. 
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arbitration under the second prong of the Chevron analysis.244 Because the 
court did not find a conflict between the FAA and the MMWA, the Chevron 
analysis is arguably dicta.  
The Fifth Circuit in Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes arrived at a similar 
result.245 Although the Walton court cited to Chevron before engaging in 
any additional analysis,246 it also conducted an analysis under McMahon.247 
The court concluded “that the text, legislative history, and purpose of the 
MMWA do not evince a congressional intent to bar arbitration of MMWA 
written warranty claims.”248 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit 
did not engage in a Chevron analysis before compelling arbitration. It even 
chastised district courts for relying solely on the FTC regulations because 
“it is improper to use the FTC regulations themselves to determine 
congressional intent here.”249 Unlike the Davis case, the Walton court was 
not unanimous.250 Without using the labels, Judge King, writing in dissent, 
would have preferred to use a “contrary regulatory command” approach, 
and her opinion begins by noting that Walton is a “classic Chevron case.”251 
The opinion is entirely focused on the Chevron two-part analysis, while 
addressing the conflict with the FAA within both prongs.252 The dissent does 
not explicitly consider the analytical framework of a “contrary regulatory 
command,” but Judge King’s analysis is similar.253 
The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion that was later withdrawn, held that a 
warrantor may not enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement against a 
consumer on a MMWA claim.254 In Kolev, the Ninth Circuit began with a 
 
244.  Id. at 1279. 
245.  298 F.3d 470, 471 (5th Cir. 2002). 
246.  Id. at 473-76 (first discussing the FAA, then the MMWA, and then Chevron). 
247.  Id. at 475-78 (conducting McMahon analysis). 
248.  Id. at 478. 
249.  Id. at 479. 
250.  Id. 
251.  Id. at 480 (King, J., dissenting). 
252.  See generally id. at 480-92 (King, J., dissenting). 
253.  The Fourth Circuit adopted an unusual analysis regarding the meaning of “pre-dispute” and 
“post-dispute” arbitration. It concluded that binding arbitration cannot replace a non-binding informal 
dispute resolution procedure, but it can be utilized after a non-binding process, such as mediation, is 
complete. Seney v. Rent-A-Center, 738 F.3d 631, 634 (4th Cir. 2013). “Pre-dispute” and “post-dispute” 
dispute arbitration generally refer to when the contract is signed—not on when in a sequence of 
procedures arbitration occurs. The court’s definitions are outside of how those terms are commonly used 
by courts, advocates, and scholars. 
254.  Kolev v. Euromotors W./The Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2011), opinion 
withdrawn by 676 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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Chevron analysis.255 In the second step of the Chevron analysis, the court 
easily found multiple reasons “why the FTC’s interpretation of the MMWA 
as precluding pre-dispute mandatory binding arbitration is a reasonable 
construction of the statute.”256 After examining the regulation under 
Chevron, the Ninth Circuit then addressed the conflict with the FAA.257 The 
Ninth Circuit, rather than considering a “contrary regulatory command,” 
considered whether the FAA made the FTC’s interpretation 
unreasonable.258 In dissent, Judge Smith agreed with the reasoning 
articulated by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.259 
These cases demonstrate that this particular question has garnered 
different analyses in each circuit that has considered it. The district courts 
also evidence divided analyses on this question.260 These cases demonstrate 
that the sequence of the analysis affects the outcome of the case.  
 
2. Direct Loan Program 
 
In 2016, the Department of Education promulgated regulations 
prohibiting the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements (and class-action 
waivers) in loans with borrowers who receive direct loans. The enabling 
 
255.  Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1025 (citing Chevron) (“We apply a two-step inquiry in reviewing agency 
constructions of statutes.”). 
256.  Id. at 1027-28 (citing reasons including congressional intent, consumer protection, and 
deference due to the agency’s interpretation). 
257.  Id. at 1029. 
258.  See id. at 1030 (discussing the “third and final reason that the FAA's proarbitration 
presumption does not render unreasonable the FTC's interpretation of the MMWA as barring pre-dispute 
mandatory binding arbitration”). 
259.  Id. at 1036 (“Even if the FTC had authority to address this question, . . . I agree with the 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits—the only federal courts of appeals to consider this question—that such a 
view would be unreasonable in light of the presumption of arbitrability created” by the FAA.). 
260.  Compare Krusch v. TAMKO Bldg. Prods., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 3d 584, 594 (M.D.N.C. 2014) 
(“After careful consideration, the court agrees with TAMKO that the MMWA does not prohibit 
enforcement of its provision for binding pre-dispute arbitration of Krusch's written warranty claims.”) 
and Seney v. Rent-a-Center, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 2d 444, 453 (D. Md. 2012) (“The Court further holds 
that the agreement to arbitrate in this case validly encompassed the Seneys’ claim under the MMWA.”) 
with Rickard v. Teynor’s Homes, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 910, 921 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (“I will, therefore, defer 
to the FTC's expertise and interpretation of the statute. Thus, the MMWA precludes enforcement of 
binding arbitration agreements for claims under a written warranty.”) and Browne v. Kline Tysons 
Imports, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“Agency interpretation supports the reasoning 
that written warranty claims under the MMWA are not subject to binding arbitration. Regulations, 
promulgated by the governmental body responsible for interpreting or administering a statute, are 
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legislation is that which established the William D. Ford Federal Direct 
Loan Program.261 The program allows students and parents to access federal 
funds for education loans based on student need.262 The statute provides 
significant detail on many loan provisions, including, but not limited to, 
interest rates, grade periods, repayment schedules, consolidation, public 
service loan forgiveness, and special terms for military students.263 This 
particular section does not include any language regarding arbitration. In 
fact, the term “arbitration” does not occur in the statute. The legislative 
history does not clearly answer the question of whether arbitration should 
be permitted or prohibited in the case for student loan borrowers. Although 
not addressing this exact question, some portions of the legislative history 
demonstrate that Congress might be supportive of arbitration, not 
restrictive.264     
The regulation at issue clearly prohibits lenders from using pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements in Direct Loan Program borrower agreements. The 
regulation states: “The school will not enter into a predispute agreement to 
arbitrate a borrower defense claim, or rely in any way on a predispute 
arbitration agreement with respect to any aspect of a borrower defense 
claim.”265 The regulation further requires schools to rescind earlier-made 
arbitration agreements.266 To the extent that schools arbitrate with 
borrowers, information relating to any arbitration must be reported to the 
Secretary of Education.267 The regulation cites the whole of the Direct Loan 
 
261.  20 U.S.C. §1087a et seq. (2008).  
262.  20 U.S.C. §1087b(a) (2008) (“The Secretary shall provide, on the basis of the need and the 
eligibility of students at each participating institution, and parents of such students, for such loans, funds 
for student and parent loans under this part. . . ”). 
263.  20 U.S.C. § 1087e (2016). 
264.  For instance, in testimony before the House, one witness suggested that arbitration be 
instituted as a consumer protection measure. Oversight Hearing on the Reauthorization of the Higher 
Education Act of 1965: Houston, Texas, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of 
the House Committee on Education and Labor, 102nd Cong. § 4 (1991) (“Those recommendations 
designed to provide consumer protection and enhanced program quality include . . . mandating 
implementation of grievance procedures and arbitration mechanisms.”).  
265.  34 C.F.R. § 685.300(f)(1) (2016). The regulations do allow for the parties to agree to 
arbitration after a dispute arises. 34 C.F.R. § 685.300(f)(1)(ii) (2016) (“A student may enter into a 
voluntary post-dispute arbitration agreement with a school to arbitrate a borrower defense claim.”). 
266.  34 C.F.R. § 685.300(f)(3) (2016) (specifying the specific language the school must use to 
notify the borrower about the unenforceability of the arbitration agreements). 
267.  34 C.F.R. § 685.300(g) (2016) (setting forth requirements). Schools have similar reporting 
requirements for litigation involving borrowers. 34 C.F.R. § 685.300(h) (2016). 
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Program legislation as the authority for the arbitration ban,268 even though 
other portions of the statutory scheme require arbitration.269 
Under the “contrary congressional command” test, the Direct Loan 
Program’s prohibition on pre-dispute arbitration agreements most likely 
would not stand. The text of the statute establishing the Direct Loan 
program is silent on the issue of arbitration, although other portions of 
education law support the use, or even require arbitration.270 Silence on the 
issue would prohibit the Department of Education from promulgating a rule 
prohibiting the use of arbitration agreements. Whether the rule would stand 
under the “contrary regulatory command” test is significantly less clear. The 
enabling legislation is broad,271 and the powers given to the Department of 
Education are also broad.272 Under a Chevron analysis, the legislation would 
likely be upheld. If so, under the “contrary regulatory command” test, the 
regulation could stand. Again, whether this regulation stands likely will 
depend on the order of analysis that a court considers. 
In the only case decided under this regulation, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia read the statutes together in a way that did not 
invoke any conflict analysis.273 In essence, it applied a “contrary regulatory 
command” analysis without using those terms. The court found no conflict 
because this regulation does not invalidate any agreements to arbitrate.274 
Instead, the new law would prohibit schools requiring such arbitration 
agreements from participating in the Direct Loan Program.275 The district 
court characterized the case as “easy”276 because the “FAA does not 
preclude federal agencies from declining to include arbitration clauses in 
 
268.  See generally 34 C.F.R. § 685.300 (2016). 
269.  20 U.S.C. § 1099b(e) (2008) (“The Secretary may not recognize the accreditation of any 
institution of higher education unless the institution of higher education agrees to submit any dispute 
involving the final denial, withdrawal, or termination of accreditation to initial arbitration prior to any 
other legal action.”). 
270.  See, e.g., Dementra Edwards, New Amendments to Resolving Special Education Disputes: 
Any Good Ideas?, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. J. 137, 156-58 (2005) (discussing the use of arbitration in 
special-education law). 
271.  See 20 U.S.C. §1087a (2008).  
272.  Id. 
273.  Cal. Ass’n of Private Postsecondary Schs. v. DeVos, No. 17-999, 2020 WL 516455, at *9 
(D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2020) (finding no conflict). 
274.  Id. at *13. 
275.  Id. at *11 (noting that the regulation “require[es] Direct Loan program participants to eschew 
predispute arbitration clauses and class action waivers in their enrollment agreements”).  
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government contracts and grant agreements.”277 The court, then, easily 
dismissed arguments regarding the Department’s ability to create this 
rule.278 
This reasoning is opposed to that of AHCA v. Burwell, discussed 
above.279 The AHCA v. Burwell court found a conflict between the FAA and 
the regulation regarding Medicaid funding, even though the regulation did 
not outright invalidate agreement to arbitrate.280 These cases present a 
fundamental disagreement on whether a funding mechanism contingent on 
the absence of an arbitration agreement runs afoul of the FAA’s command 
to enforce agreements to arbitrate.281  
 
3. Medicare and Medicaid 
 
Most recently, CMS issued a new rule regarding pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in the area of long-term care (LTC) facilities.282 For its statutory 
authority, CMS again points to its authority to “to protect the health, safety, 
welfare, and rights of residents and to promote the effective and efficient 
use of public moneys” as its enabling legislation.283 CMS additionally stated 
that the “rule does not purport to regulate the enforceability of any 
arbitration agreement, and, assuming that it limits the right of the Secretary 
to protect the rights of Medicaid beneficiaries, in our view, this rule does 
not pose any conflict with the language of the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA).”284 Although CMS originally sought to remove a provision in the 
regulation that would prohibit a LTC facility from conditioning admission 
on the signing of an arbitration agreement, the agency decided to leave that 
provision in the final regulation based on comments received.285 “Therefore, 
facilities will continue to be prohibited from requiring any resident or his or 
 
277.  Id. 
278.  Id. at *14-*16. 
279.  See supra notes 114-122 and accompanying text. 
280.  See supra note 120. 
281.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (making agreements to arbitrate specifically enforceable). 
282.  Revision of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities: Arbitration Agreements, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 34,7183 (proposed July 18, 2019) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 418). The rule was scheduled to 
go into effect on September 16, 2019. Id. 
283.  Id. (citing Sections 1819(f)(1) and 1919(f)(1) of the Act of the Nursing Home Reform Act, 
part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987). 
284.  Id. 
285.  Id. at 34,719. 
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her representative to sign an agreement for binding arbitration as a condition 
of admission to the facility.”286 In addition, the regulations will insert a 
thirty-day opt-out provision into any arbitration agreement signed by or on 
behalf of a resident.287 
CMS addressed commenters’ concerns about the enforceability of these 
regulations in light of the FAA. CMS stated:  
After reexamining the issue and reviewing public 
comments we received, at this point we believe that a 
balance can be struck that accommodates the use of 
arbitration agreements while also protecting the rights of 
LTC facility residents. Thus, we are finalizing the removal 
of the prohibition on pre- dispute, binding arbitration 
agreements and the provisions regarding the content of the 
agreement and implementing requirements we believe will 
provide greater transparency in the arbitration process.288 
The final rule would allow the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, 
provided that the patient gives informed consent to the provision and 
admission is not contingent on such signing.289 Compared to the 2016 
version of the rule, this rule is significantly more nuanced because it does 
not explicitly invalidate arbitration agreements. 
As opposed to most other examples in this article, the CMS regulations 
do not prohibit enforcement of all agreements to arbitrate. Instead, LTC 
facilities may still ask their residents to sign arbitration agreements, 
provided that such agreements are not a condition of moving into the 
facility. If a court were to view the regulation as consistent with the FAA 
because the parties are still free to contract for arbitration, then the 
regulation and the statute are not in conflict and both can stand. 
On the contrary, a court may draw lessons from the Supreme Court’s 
preemption doctrine, which has expanded considerably since Concepcion in 
2011.290 Although preemption applies in conflicts between the FAA and 
state authority, preemption analysis, like conflict analysis, must first 
 
286.  Id.  
287.  Id. (“Finally, based on comments, we are adding a requirement that facilities grant to 
residents a 30 calendar day period during which they may rescind their agreement to an arbitration 
agreement.”). 
288.  Id. at 34,725. 
289.  Id. 
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determine if the two competing laws are consistent. In the preemption 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has invalidated laws that have a negative 
“impact” on arbitration, even if those competing laws do not necessarily 
invalidate the arbitration agreements.291  
If a court finds no conflict between the agency rule and the FAA, then 
the analysis ends and the agency rule stands. If the court does find a conflict, 
then the resolution may depend on the order of analysis conducted. If the 
court looks first for a contrary congressional command, the court will not 
be able to find one. The AHCA v. Burwell court found nothing in the 
legislation that would support a finding of a contrary congressional 
command.292 At that point, the analysis would end, and the regulation would 
be unenforceable. This particular regulation might have additional 
problems, even if the court is following the contrary regulatory command 
approach. Again, the AHCA v. Burwell court suggested that CMS did not 
have the authority to issue arbitration regulations under its broad and vague 
authority regarding the health, safety, welfare, and rights of its patients.293 
Although CMS changed the nature of the regulation from an absolute ban 
to a conditional permission, the underlying authority remains the same. A 
reviewing court may still find that regulating arbitration in any respect does 
not fall within the scope of the enabling legislation. If, however, a court does 
find that CMS has the authority to regulate arbitration, under a contrary 




This article illustrates a growing area of arbitration law, i.e., federal 
regulatory arbitration law, so early in its infancy that the courts have yet to 
 
291.  See Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 147 A.3d 490, 509-10 (Pa. 2016) (finding 
preempted a bifurcation rule because “when a generally applicable contract defense is applied in a 
manner hostile to arbitration, or when the state rule stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
FAA's objectives,” the state law is preempted); see also Kristen M. Blankley, Impact Preemption: A 
New Theory of Federal Arbitration Preemption, 67 FLA. L. REV. 711, 744 (2015) (explaining how the 
Concepcion Court was the first to invalidate a state law that did not invalidate arbitration agreements, 
but negatively impacted arbitration); see also Olga Bykov, Vindication of Federal Statutory Rights: The 
Future of Cost-Based Challenges to Arbitration Clauses After American Express v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant and Green Tree v. Randolph, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1323, 1355 (2017) (discussing 
arbitration preemption as a form of “field/impact” preemption).  
292.  See supra notes 205-209 and accompanying text. 
293.  Id. 








64            Washington University Journal of Law and Policy        [Vol. 63 
 
determine how to interpret this law in conjunction with the FAA. This 
article suggests two competing frameworks for conducing such analysis, 
through either a “contrary congressional command” approach or a “contrary 
regulatory command” approach.  
Although the “contrary congressional command” approach follows 
more closely current Supreme Court arbitration law, the “contrary 
regulatory command” approach deserves consideration because of agency 
expertise and Chevron deference. These two rules will yield similar results 
when the enabling legislation speaks directly to the issue of arbitration, so 
the analytical framework will be most influential in cases in which the 
enabling legislation is “silent” or ambiguous on the issue of arbitration. 
This article suggests that the “contrary congressional command” 
approach is sounder in both law and policy to the “contrary regulatory 
command” rule, but adopting courts at this point in the jurisprudence have 
flexibility and arguments to defend either approach. The primary purpose 
for this Article, then, is to lay the foundation and provide a framework to 
work through these legal issues as they are presented to the judiciary in the 
future.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol63/iss1/8
